about
The Representational Status of Deep Learning Models (arxiv.org)
1 point by porteclefs on Mar 22, 2023 | hide | past | pdf | 1 comment on HN

In plain words: It separates two meanings of "representation"—how a model behaves versus how it relates to its target—and argues deep learning models do the latter. Their knowledge is global, not made of stable parts, which challenges explainability tools that point to pieces of the network.

Abstract

This paper aims to clarify the representational status of Deep Learning Models (DLMs). While commonly referred to as 'representations', what this entails is ambiguous due to a conflation of functional and relational conceptions of representation. This paper argues that while DLMs represent their targets in a relational sense, in general, we have no good reason to believe that DLMs encode locally semantically decomposable representations of their targets. That is, the representational capacity these models have is largely global, rather than decomposable into stable, local subrepresentations. This result has immediate implications for explainable AI (XAI) and directs attention toward exploring the global relational nature of deep learning representations and their relationship both to models more generally to understand their potential role in future scientific inquiry.

Eamon Duede
arXiv:2303.12032 · cs.AI, cs.CY, cs.LG · submitted Mar 21, 2023 · updated Mar 23, 2025
abstract · pdf · html · 18 pages, 1 figure

add comment on HN

The paper aims to clarify the representational status of deep learning models (DLMs) in relation to their targets. It highlights the confusion caused by the interchangeable usage of terms 'representation' and 'model' in AI, neuroscience, and philosophy. The paper argues that while DLMs do represent their targets in a relational sense, there is no evidence to support the belief that they encode fine-grained representations. Instead, DLMs are more akin to highly idealized models. This has implications for explainable AI (XAI) and raises concerns about potential epistemic and practical risks associated with interpreting DLMs as having fine-grained representations. The paper also discusses the reasons for the neglect of representational status in deep learning, including ambiguity in the concept of representation and the lack of model transparency.