In plain words: A checker that double-checks proofs a neural network is safe, built inside a formal proof system using exact arithmetic instead of rounded decimals, so rounding errors can't fake a result. Unlike earlier checkers, its correctness rules are written down and are being formally proven.
Abstract
Recent developments in deep neural networks (DNNs) have led to their adoption in safety-critical systems, which in turn has heightened the need for guaranteeing their safety. These safety properties of DNNs can be proven using tools developed by the verification community. However, these tools are themselves prone to implementation bugs and numerical stability problems, which make their reliability questionable. To overcome this, some verifiers produce proofs of their results which can be checked by a trusted checker. In this work, we present a novel implementation of a proof checker for DNN verification. It improves on existing implementations by offering numerical stability and greater verifiability. To achieve this, we leverage two key capabilities of Imandra, an industrial theorem prover: its support of infinite precision real arithmetic and its formal verification infrastructure. So far, we have implemented a proof checker in Imandra, specified its correctness properties and started to verify the checker's compliance with them. Our ongoing work focuses on completing the formal verification of the checker and further optimizing its performance.
Remi Desmartin, Omri Isac, Grant Passmore, Kathrin Stark, Guy Katz, Ekaterina Komendantskaya
arXiv:2307.06299 · cs.LO, cs.LG, cs.PL · submitted Jul 12, 2023 · updated Feb 13, 2024
abstract · pdf · html · This is a preprint version of the paper that appeared at LOPSTR 2023