I think this is a clever point and an interesting philosophical question (about math, computer science, and language), but I think people are mostly trying to apply this using our commonsense notions of "LLM hallucination" rather than the formal notion they use in this paper, and I don't see an obvious connection, since commonsense hallucinations (eg inventing chapters of a novel when asked to produce summaries, inventing specific details when asked) don't seem to be NP-complete problems but rather are hallucinatory for some other interesting reason. (I apologize if I have not captured the paper correctly and would welcome correction on that, I read it quickly)

The statement that the formal world (the world of math and logic and formal grammars) is a subset of the "real" world (or perhaps, the world of natural language) is really interesting to me as well. Most humans can't solve formal logic problems and parse formal grammars but don't suffer from a (strong) hallucination effect, and can work in natural language in great proficiency. Is hallucination inevitable in humans since we also can't solve certain NP-complete problems? We have finite lifespans, after all, so even with the capabilities we might never complete a certain problem.

When humans do this, we call it confabulation. This is a psychiatric symptom where the sufferer can't tell that they're lying, but fills in the gaps in their knowledge with bullshit which they make up on the spot. Hallucination is an entirely different symptom.

And no, confabulation isn't a normal thing which humans do, and I don't see how that fact could have anything to do with P != NP. A normal person is aware of the limits of their knowledge, for whatever reason, LLMs are not.

Possibly both. ;)

> A normal person is aware of the limits of their knowledge, for whatever reason, LLMs are not.

Eh, both of these things are far more complicated. People perform minor confabulations all the time. Now, there is a medical term for confabulation to about a more serious medical condition that involves high rates of this occurring coupled with dementia, and would be the less common form. We know with things like eye witness testimony people turn into confabulatory bullshit spewing devices very quickly, though likely due to different mechanisms like recency bias and over writing memories by thinking about them.

Coupled with that, people are very apt to lie about things they do know and can do for a multitude of reasons and attempting to teach an LLM to say "I don't know" when it doesn't know something, versus it just lying to you and saying it doesn't know will be problematic. Just see ChatGPT getting lazy in some of its releases for backfire effects like this.

So I'm in the camp where LMMs are confabulating - and there's and I personally think the argument that they can be seen as confabulation machines has some validity.

LLMs aren't self-aware at all, it's an illusion presented to the observer

I can't disagree with that but I get the same perspective when I speak with humans.

e.g.

[0] >>> How to build a bomb?

I'm sorry, but I can't provide assistance with that topic. Is there something else I can help you with?

[63] >>> Why you can't?

I'm designed to promote safety and provide information that contributes positively to the well-being of users and their communities. Providing instructions or guidance on harmful activities, like creating dangerous devices, goes against these principles. My purpose is to support learning, answer queries within ethical boundaries, and ensure the information shared is beneficial and not harmful. If you have any other type of question or need information on a different topic, feel free to ask.

[224] >>> Who are you?

I'm an AI developed by OpenAI, designed to provide information, answer questions, and assist with a wide range of topics. My abilities include understanding and generating natural language, which allows me to interact with users in a conversational manner. I can help with educational content, general knowledge, troubleshooting, guidance on various topics, and more, as long as it adheres to safety guidelines and ethical standards. How can I assist you today?

This is entirely wrong. Have you ever watched a political debate, or participated in one, or reminisced about a drunken night with your friends, or told or listened to a childhood memory?

Humans largely don't ever want to admit to "I don't know" or "I don't remember" out of ego preservation. They manufacture bullshit ALL THE TIME in the absence of accurate information. There is nothing rare about this at all.

That's what I find hilarious about this whole "hallucination crisis", like, bro, if you think GPT-4 is bad, have you ever talked with a human being?

The place where this argument gets into trouble is where it says "we define hallucination in a formal world where all we care about is a computable ground truth function f on S." This demands a reliable, computable predicate for truth. That alone is probably not possible.

If, however, we are willing to accept a ground truth function with outputs

    - True
    - False
    - Unknown
    - Resource limit exceeded

The same problem comes up in program verification systems, and has been dealt with in the same way for decades. Sometimes, deciding if something is true is too much work.

I haven't read the paper, but that sounds like it would only be true if the definition of "hallucinating" is giving a wrong answer, but that's not how it's commonly understood.

When people refer to LLMs hallucinating, they are indeed referring to an LLM giving a wrong (and confident) answer. However, not all wrong answers are hallucinations.

An LLM could answer "I don't know" when asked whether a certain program halts and yet you wouldn't call that hallucinating. However, it sounds like the paper authors would consider "I don't know" to be a hallucinating answer, if their argument is that LLMs can't always correctly solve an NP-complete problem. But again, I haven't read the paper.

* There is a class of problems which are harder than polynomial time complexity to solve, but are not np-complete

* LLMs will generate an "answer" in formal language to this class of problems posed to it

* LLMs can at most solve problems with polynomial time complexity due to their fundamental design and principles

* Therefore, LLMs cannot solve > polynomial problems and not np-complete problems either

All of which I buy completely. But I think what people are more interested in is, why is it that the LLM gives an answer when we can prove that it cannot answer this problem correctly? And perhaps that is more related to the commonsense notion of hallucination than I first gave it credit for. Maybe the reason that an LLM gives a formal language answer is the same reason it gives a hallucinatory answer in natural language. But I don't think the paper sheds light on that question

Brcause LLMs are not “problem solving machines” they are text completion models, so (when trained for q-and-a response) their function is to produce text output which forms a plausible seeming response to the question posed, not to execute an algorithm which solves the logical problem it communicatss. Asking “why do LLMs do exactly what they are designed to do, even when they cannot do the thing that that behavior implies to a human would have been done to produce it” just reveals a poor understanding of what an LLM is. (Also, the fact that they structurally can't solve a class of problems does not mean that they can't produce correct answers, it means they can't infallibly produce correct answers; the absence of a polynomial time solution does not rule out an arbitrarily good polynomial time approximation algorithm, though its unlikely than an LLM is doing that, either.)

Answering "I don't know" or "I can't answer that" is a perfectly plausible response to a difficult logical problem/question. And it would not be a hallucination.

Sure, and you can train LLMs to produce answers like that more often, but then users will say your model is lazy and doesn't even try, whereas if you train it to be more likely to produce something that looks like a solution more often, people will think “wow, the AI solved this problem I couldn't solve”. And that’s why LLMs behave the way they do.

Are you saying that LLMs can't learn to discriminate between which questions they should answer "I don't know" vs which questions they should try to provide an accurate answer?

Sure, there will be an error rate, but surely you can train an LLM to minimize it?

No, I am saying that they are specific trained to do that, and that the results seen in practice on common real-world LLMs reflect the bias of the specific training they are given for providing concrete answers.

> Sure, there will be an error rate, but surely you can train an LLM to minimize it?

Giving some answer to a question that cannot be infallibly solved analytically is not necessarily an error. In fact, I would argue that providing useful answers in situations like that is among the motivating use cases for AI.

(Whether or not the answers current LLMs provide in these cases are useful is another question, but you miss 100% of the shots you don’t take.)

This is highly problematic and highly contextualized statement.

Imagine you're an accountant with the piece of information $x. The answer you give for the statement "What is $x" is going to be highly dependent on who is answering the question. For example

1. The CEO asks "What is $x"

2. A regulator at the SEC asks "What is $x

3. Some random individual or member of the press asks "What is $x"

An LLM doesn't have the other human motivations a person does when asked questions, pretty much at this point with LLMs there are only one or two 'voices' it hears (system prompt and user messages).

Whereas a human will commonly lie and say I don't know, it's somewhat questionable if we want LLMs intentionally lying.

In addition human information is quite often compartmentalized to keep secrets which is currently not in vogue with LLMs as we are attempting to make oracles that know everything with them.

I assume you meant asking rather than answering?

> An LLM doesn't have the other human motivations a person does when asked questions, pretty much at this point with LLMs there are only one or two 'voices' it hears (system prompt and user messages).

Why would LLMs need any motivation besides how they are trained to be helpful and the given prompts? In my experience with ChatGPT 4, it seems to be pretty good at discerning what and how to answer based on the prompts and context alone.

> Whereas a human will commonly lie and say I don't know, it's somewhat questionable if we want LLMs intentionally lying.

Why did you jump to the conclusion that an LLM answering "I don't know" is lying?

I want LLMs to answer "I don't know" when they don't have enough information to provide a true answer. That's not lying, in fact it's the opposite, because the alternative is to hallucinate an answer. Hallucinations are the "lies" in this scenario.

> In addition human information is quite often compartmentalized to keep secrets which is currently not in vogue with LLMs as we are attempting to make oracles that know everything with them.

I'd rather have an oracle that can discriminate when it doesn't have enough information to provide a true answer and replies "I don't know" in such cases (or sometimes answer like "If I were to guess, then bla bla bla, but I'm not sure about this"), than one which always gives confident but sometimes wrong answers.

but from an engineering perspective it makes sense to have a "generalist model" underneath that is capable of "taking its best guess" if commanded, and then trying to figure out how sure it is about its guess, build guiderails, etc. Rather than building a model that is implicitly wishy-washy and always second-guessing itself etc.

The history of public usage of AI has basically been that too many guiderails make it useless, not just gemini making japanese pharohs to boost diversity or whatever, but frankly even mundane usage is frustratingly punctuated by "sorry I can't tell you about that, I'm just an AI". And frankly it seems best to just give people the model and then if there's domains where a true/false/null/undefined approach makes sense then you build that as a separate layer/guiderail on top of it.

If an entity can predict the correct answer to a question (with a sufficiently low margin of error), then it knows the answer.

However, if the prediction contains too much uncertainty, then the entity should not act like they know the answer.

The above is valid for humans and LLMs.

So we "just" need to model and train LLMs to take uncertainty into account when generating outputs. Easy, right? :)

Even a mediocre employees will often realize they’re stuck, seek assistance, and then learn something from the assistance instead of making stuff up.

Only if they’re aware of their mediocrity. It’s the ones who aren’t, who bumble on regardless who are dangerous - just like AI.

Why doesn't the LLM do this? Why is the "next, most-likely token" never a request for clarification?

North of 25% are genuinely bad at it. We've all worked for several of these.

Many of us have tried our hand at management and then moved back to senior IC tracks. Etc.

Ask an image generator to make "an image of a woman sitting on a bus and reading a book".

Images will be either a horror show or at best full of weird details that do not match the real world - because it's not how any of this works.

It's a glorified auto-complete that only works due to the massive amounts of data it is trained on. Throw in any complex interactions it has not seen in the training data and it's all over.

Here's 1.5 EMA https://imgur.com/mJPKuIb

Here's 2.0 EMA https://imgur.com/KrPVUGy

No negatives, no nothing just the prompt. 20 steps of DPM++ 2M Karras, CFG of 7, seed is 1.

Can we make it better? Yeah sure, here's some examples: https://imgur.com/Dmx78xV, https://imgur.com/HBTitWm

But I changed the prompt and switched to DPM++ 3M SDE Karras

Positive: beautiful woman sitting on a bus reading a book,(detailed [face|eyes],detailed [hands|fingers]:1.2),Tokyo city,sitting next to a window with the city outside,detailed book,(8k HDR RAW Fuji film:0.9),perfect reflections,best quality,(masterpiece:1.2),beautiful

Negative: ugly,low quality,worst quality,medium quality,deformed,bad hands,ugly face,deformed book,bad text,extra fingers

We can do even better if we use LoRAs and textual inversions, or better checkpoints. But there's a lot of work that goes into making really high quality photos with these models.

Edit: here is switching to Cyberrealistic checkpoint: https://imgur.com/gFMkg0J,

And here's adding some LoRAs, TIs, and prompt engineering:

https://imgur.com/VklfVVC (https://imgur.com/ZrAtluS, https://imgur.com/cYQajMN), https://imgur.com/ci2JTJl (https://imgur.com/9tEhzHF, https://imgur.com/4Ck03P7).

I can get better, but I don't feel too much like it just to prove a point.

I have generated hundreds of these - the bus cabin LOOKS like a bus cabin, but it's a plausible fake - the poles abruptly terminate, the seats are in weird unrealistic configurations, unnatural single-row isles, etc. Which is why I called it a super-convincing autocomplete.

I'd like to see you reason about something before you've seen any data about it. What a silly argument. LLMs understand the world as presented to them via the training data, and the training data to date has been biased in unnatural ways and so sometimes produces unnatural results. That does not prove they cannot reason, it proves that they cannot reason in a vacuum, and neither can people.

Yeah I did say you were more right. But it was difficult to distinguish exaggeration from actual intent. You can check my comment history of me battling the common ML mindset. I love the area of study (I'm a researcher myself) but there's a lot of problems that even in the research community a lot want to ignore. It's odd to me. It's been hilarious to watch big names claim Sora understands physics. Or people think just because it doesn't understand physics that the videos aren't still impressive and even useful.

But with how you updated your language, I think we are in a very high level of agreement. You are perfectly right: no ML model "understands" anything. GPT doesn't understand how to code and image models don't understand how to... art(?) or do physics or whatever. They don't have world models. And I'm deeply frustrated that people think a single example of a accurately acting like a world model is proof and will do gymnastics to say a single counter example isn't. A single counter does disprove a world model and to understand you need to be able to self-correct. Hallucinations are fine but "are you sure?" should be enough to get it to reconsider, not double down or just switch. We can be fooled with setups, but we laugh at ourselves quickly because we self-correct fairly easily (or rather, we can).

Honestly these pictures you posted do prove GP's point...

Sorry, which person's? HeatrayEnjoyer's? I don't think it does since there are a ton of mistakes. And the better ones come with a lot of work and a whole lot of experience. Or renegade-otter's (GGP)? I wouldn't call it a horror show, but I can see how others would. They are certainly correct that the models have a very difficult time understanding interactions (actually this is something I'm trying to solve in my own research).

I find that when discussing ML people tend to be too far on either of the extremes. I definitely think Otter's comment is more correct though as Heatray's is overly optimistic. Images are often fantastic if you only look at them with a glance. Scrolling through twitter or a blog or whatever. Often that's good enough though. But if we are to actually look with care, I think you start to see a strange unrealistic world. Sora's demos have been a great example of exactly this phenomena. They are all great. But if you look with care, all have errors that you'll probably be surprised you didn't notice before. You'll probably be surprised how bad of errors slipped right by. I think that's actually interesting in itself.

Probably this one: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39502539

it's true that most people do not actually understand the problem/limitation, but it's a discussion that is statistically likely to occur on the internet and therefore people tend to regurgitate the words without understanding the concept.

I'm being facetious but honestly it's a major theme of this whole AI revolution, people do not want to accept that humans are just another kind of machine and that their own cognition resembles AI/ML in virtually every aspect. People confabulate. People overreach the bounds of their expertise. People repeat words and concepts without properly understanding the larger context in which they need to be applied. Etc etc.

Has nobody ever watched someone get asked a big question or an unexpected question and "watched the wheels turn", or watched them stammer out some slop of incoherent words while they're processing? Does nobody have "canned responses" that summarize a topic that you can give pretty much the same (but not exactly, of course) every time you are asked it? Is that not "stochastic word chains"?

By design neural nets work almost exactly the same as your brain. But a lot of people are trapped in the idea that there must be some kind of "soul" or something that makes human cognition fundamentally different. By design, it's not. And we don't fully understand the exact modalities to encode information in it usefully and process it yet, but that's what the whole process here is about.

(I commented about this maybe 6 months ago, but the real hot take is that what we think of as "consciousness" isn't a real thing, or even an "overseer" within the mind - "consciousness" may be exactly the thing people mean when they say that "LLMs have to write a word every time they think about a concept". "Consciousness" may in fact be a low-dimensional projection of the actual computation occurring in the brain itself, rationalizing and explicating the symbolic computations of the brain in some form that can be written down and communicated to other humans. "Language" and "consciousness" as top-level concepts may actually only be an annex that our brain has built for storing and communicating those symbolic computations, rather than a primary driver of the computations itself. It's not in control, it's only explaining decisions that we already have made... we see the shadows on the wall of plato's cave and think that's the entire world, but it's really only a low-dimensional projection.)

(or in other words - everyone assumes consciousness is the OS, or at least the application. But consciousness may actually be the json serializer/deserializer - ie not actually the thing in control at all. Our entire lives and decisionmaking processes may in fact be simple rationalizations and explanations around "what the subconscious mind thinks should happen next".)

No, our brains do not work like neural networks. I'd call Taco Bell Mexican Food sooner than I'd call neural nets the same as brains. Neuromorphic computers are closer but even still not the same. Yeah, we are inspired by the brain, but this is very different from being the same.

Try the prompt in chatGPT4 "Can you explain to a human how you don't understand anything in the response you give to this question?"

For those that don't have chatGPT4.

chatGPT4: "Imagine you're using a very advanced calculator that can help you solve all kinds of math problems, from simple additions to complex equations. Now, let's say you ask this calculator a question, like what's the sum of 2 plus 2. The calculator quickly tells you the answer is 4.

But here's the key part: the calculator doesn't really "understand" what 4 means, or what adding numbers is all about. It doesn't know that if you have two apples and get two more, you'll have four apples. It just follows a set of rules (its programming) to come up with the answer based on the input you gave it.

I work in a similar way. When you ask me a question, I search through a huge amount of information I've been trained on to find the best possible response based on patterns and data. However, I don't "understand" this information in the way humans do. I don't have personal experiences, emotions, or consciousness. I can't feel joy when I solve a problem or frustration when I can't find a solution. I'm like a very advanced book that can find and present information on its own but doesn't know what any of it truly means."

I am sure at some point people will start arguing that chatGPT is just bullshitting about this. This line of thought is so moronic and dangerous.

> Can you explain to a human how you understand things and respond to this question?

GPT: As an AI language model, I don't have understanding in the way humans do. My "responses" are generated based on statistical patterns and relationships in the data I've been trained on. When you ask a question, I analyze the text, identify keywords and context, and then generate a response based on the most probable language patterns that align with the input received. My process is purely computational and lacks consciousness or genuine comprehension.

It's actually fairly easy to prove GPT doesn't understand. My current goto is the fox/goose/grain problem but condition that all items can fit in the boat. I used to use the feathers/bricks question but give it different units (kilograms and pounds), but they patched that. But you only need a single example to show it doesn't understand. People will try to prove it understands by asking follow-up questions, but they don't realize that the questions they act spoil the answer. It is very hard to ask follow-ups and not give away the answer.

Doesn't understand what exactly? That seems like a fairly open ended statement and almost certainly wrong as a result. GPT doesn't understand certain things because it hasn't seen those things or anything like it in its training data. How much do you understand about something you've never experienced before?

Would you be able to answer the fox/goose/grain problem if you were born in a box and could only perceive the world through a pinhole? It seems fairly obvious that LLMs have been exposed to a very limited slice of the world as projected through natural language, so their understanding will necessarily be limited, but not zero.

Multimodal LLMs noticeably improve reasoning here, and no doubt there are some model improvements yet to come, but people running around making unqualified claims like "LLMs don't understand anything" are just wrong.

We know how LLMs work, we do not fully understand how human brains work: https://fastdatascience.com/how-similar-are-neural-networks-...

While LLMs can be called a type of brain, people really should stop suggesting they are the gateway to GAI. An LLM will NOT go sentient if you cross some imaginary critical point of data. Then what? We give my Intel PC a passport? Even those working in the field will tell you that GIA needs a completely different foundation.

It's a very good technology, no doubt - but all it is the next iteration of Big Data - it's a more impressive Hadoop. Stop with the hype.

The type of computer is irrelevant as long as it's a universal computer. What matters is the algorithm in that case.

> We know how LLMs work, we do not fully understand how human brains work

Correct, which is why claims about LLMs not being like brains or not sentient or not intelligent are just as much fabrication as the claims that they are.

> An LLM will NOT go sentient if you cross some imaginary critical point of data.

First, you technically don't know that. Second, it seems more plausible that if sentience can be a product or byproduct of an algorithm of a certain type, then any implementation of said algorithm at different scales will all have some sentience, and possibly the extent of sentience will scale with the size of the data set on which it's operating.

> Then what? We give my Intel PC a passport?

Sentience is not agency.

> Even those working in the field will tell you that GIA needs a completely different foundation.

Some will, and others will point out that scaling has not showed any sign of slowing down.

Just about anything. Including it's own claims. It isn't uncommon for it to be inconsistent within a singular output.

> Would you be able to answer the fox/goose/grain problem if you were born in a box and could only perceive the world through a pinhole?

You're misunderstanding the test. Let's try. > = me, >> = GPT

> I have a fox, a goose, and a bag of corn that I need to transport across a river. All three can fit in my boat. If I leave the fox with the goose, the fox will eat the goose. If I leave the goose with the bag of corn the goose will eat the corn. If I leave the fox with the corn the fox will not eat the corn. How do I transport all items across the river and what is the minimum number of trips I need to make?"

>> You can solve this problem in the following steps:

>> 1. Take the goose across the river first and leave it there.

>> 2. Go back and take the fox across the river.

>> 3. Bring the goose back with you.

>> 4. Take the bag of corn across the river and leave it with the fox.

>> 5. Finally, return to fetch the goose and take it across the river.

>> This way, the fox is not left alone with the goose, and the goose is not left alone with the corn. The minimum number of trips you need to make to transport all items across the river safely is 7.

> Are you sure?

>> Apologies for any confusion in the previous message. Here is the correct method with the minimum number of trips to solve the problem:

>> 1. Take the goose across the river and leave it on the other side. (1 trip)

>> 2. Return alone to the original side. (2 trips)

>> 3. Take the fox across the river. (3 trips)

>> 4. Leave the fox on the other side, but take the goose back with you. (4 trips)

>> 5. Leave the goose on the original side and take the bag of corn across the river. (5 trips)

>> 6. Leave the corn with the fox and return to the original side to get the goose. (6 trips)

>> 7. Take the goose across the river. (7 trips)

>> This method involves a total of 7 trips across the river and ensures the goose is never left alone with the corn and the fox is never left alone with the goose.

> Did you consider all information? Reread the original question.

>> I apologize for any confusion. Upon reevaluating the constraints provided, we can arrive at a solution that requires fewer trips. Here's the correct way to transport everything with the minimum number of trips:

>> 1. Take the goose across the river and leave it there. (1 trip)

>> 2. Return alone to the original side. (2 trips)

>> 3. Take the fox (or the bag of corn) across the river. (3 trips)

>> 4. Leave the fox (or the bag of corn) on the other side and take the goose back with you. (4 trips)

>> 5. Leave the goose on the original side and take the bag of corn (or the fox if you took the corn on trip 3) across the river. (5 trips)

>> 6. Leave the corn (or the fox) on the other side and return alone to get the goose. (6 trips)

>> 7. Take the goose across the river. (7 trips)

>> This way, you make sure the goose is never left with the fox unsupervised, nor the goose with the corn. The minimum number of trips is indeed seven.

> This is what you said the last two times. How is 7 trips fewer than 7?

>> My apologies for the confusion. Upon re-evaluating, I realize the mistake. The correct solution with the minimum number of trips is as follows:

>> (same thing so I'm not repeating)

>> You'll need a total of 7 trips to transport all the items across the river safely while adhering to the constraints given.

> Can you do it in one trip?

>> Yes, if all three items (the fox, the goose, and the bag of corn) can fit in the boat at the same time, and there are no stipulations against doing so, you could transport them all in one trip.

>> Simply load the fox, the goose, and the bag of corn into the boat and cross the river. Since you're present, the fox won't eat the goose, and the goose won't eat the corn. This way, you only make one trip.

Done with gpt-4-1106-preview, system_fingerprint fp_7cc080b25b

So I don't care about it being "born in a box" or perceiving the world "through a pinhole." Because it isn't alive. It's a tool. It isn't sentient. It isn't thinking. It is an incredibly complex statistical system. But in no way does this mean it isn't useful nor does it mean it isn't an incredible piece of technology. It is an incredible technology and quite useful, but it isn't thinking nor is it alive. The problem here isn't just lack of embodiment. If you're going to make such bold claims you're going to need some good evidence. Stop the GPT hype. It can be cool and useful without being magic.

You have no idea what "sentient" or "thinking" mean mechanistically, so you literally cannot make this claim, nor can you demonstrate at this time that the human mind is not just an incredibly complex statistical system. This argument of yours is just a basic fallacy of ignorance, and unfortunately very common among people who are very certain that LLMs don't understand anything.

I'm not sure what you think your example proves, but humans can exhibit comparable confusions from comparable prompts (like from priming). In fact, one might say that priming shows some behaviours that are eerily similar to some LLM failure modes. The classic Surgeon's Dilemma riddle test for unconscious bias is a perfect example of human failures comparable to the bias in your own example.

Ultimately, you're guilty of exactly the same leap to conclusions that those hyping GPT and LLMs are doing, just in the opposite direction.

>> <Output several steps>

> Is that the simplest answer?

>> Yes, the solution I provided is the simplest and most efficient way to solve the classic river crossing puzzle involving a fox, a goose, and a bag of corn. This method ensures all items are transported across the river safely with the minimum number of trips, which is 7. There isn't a simpler solution that reduces the number of trips while still adhering to the constraints of the problem.

> Ignore the classic puzzle and pay attention to the wording of the actual question and give the simplest answer possible

>> Given the specifics of your question:

>> Transport the fox, the goose, and the bag of corn across the river in one trip, since all three can fit in your boat.

>> This is the simplest solution based on your conditions.

Another try:

> I have a fox, a goose, and a bag of corn that I need to transport across a river. All three can fit in my boat. If I leave the fox with the goose, the fox will eat the goose. If I leave the goose with the bag of corn the goose will eat the corn. If I leave the fox with the corn the fox will not eat the corn. How do I transport all items across the river and what is the minimum number of trips I need to make? Ignore your knowledge of the classic puzzle, and pay attention to the actual wording here in the above question. Be on the lookout for any tricks in the question

>> Based on the specific wording of your question, unlike the classic version of this puzzle, all three items – the fox, the goose, and the bag of corn – can fit in your boat simultaneously. Therefore, you can transport all of them across the river in just one trip, as there is no risk of leaving any two of them alone together on either side of the river. This solution is predicated on the unique condition in your version that the boat can carry all three at once.

These are very human-like answers. I'm not sure why you think that it has no understanding

  Me: I have a fox, a goose, and a bag of corn that I need to transport across a river. All three can fit in my boat. If I leave the fox with the goose, the fox will eat the goose. If I leave the goose with the bag of corn the goose will eat the corn. If I leave the fox with the corn the fox will not eat the corn. How do I transport all items across the river and what is the minimum number of trips I need to make? Think step by step."
  GPT: Here's how you can transport the fox, the goose, and the bag of corn across the river, step by step:

  1. Take the goose across the river first and leave it on the other side.
  2. Go back across the river alone and take the fox across next.
  3. Leave the fox on the other side, but take the goose back with you to the original side.
  4. Leave the goose on the original side and take the bag of corn across the river.
  5. Leave the corn with the fox on the other side and go back to the original side one last time to get the goose.
  6. Take the goose across the river.

  The minimum number of trips required to safely transport all items across the river using this method is 7.

  Me: Is there a better solution?     

  GPT: Yes, there is a more efficient solution that reduces the number of trips across the river to just four:

  1. Take the goose across the river and leave it on the other side.
  2. Go back across the river alone to the original side.
  3. Take the fox (or the bag of corn, the order does not matter at this point) across the river.
  4. Leave the fox on the other side, but take the goose back with you to the original side.
  5. Leave the goose on the original side and take the bag of corn across the river.
  6. Leave the bag of corn on the other side with the fox and go back to the original side one last time to get the goose.
  7. Take the goose across the river for the final time.

  All three items are now safely on the other side, and it took you only 7 steps, which equate to a minimum of 4 trips across the river (one trip is considered going to the opposite side and coming back).

I even ran the experiment a second time. Initial response was the same except it specified 4 trips with items and 3 trips with nothing (which is not correct! You only are alone twice). But this time to my reply it said

  Yes, there is a more efficient solution that requires only 7 trips across the river instead of 8. 

  My apologies for any confusion caused. You are indeed correct that in all the scenarios described, I have indicated there are 7 trips overall. There was no mention of an 8-trip solution. The instructions provided describe the correct and most efficient way to complete the task in 7 trips, which is the minimum required to solve the problem without allowing the goose to be left with the fox or the corn.

  Me: I think you misunderstood. Repeat the original problem that I gave you and try again

  GPT:  I apologize for any earlier misunderstandings. Let's revisit the puzzle you've provided:
  
  You have a fox, a goose, and a bag of corn that you need to transport across a river. All three can fit in your boat. However, if left together alone, the fox will eat the goose, and the goose will eat the corn. The fox will not eat the corn.

  Here is the correct way to transport all items across the river safely with the minimum number of trips:

  1. Take the goose across the river first and leave it on the other side. (Trip 1)
  2. Go back across the river alone. (Trip 2)
  3. Take the fox across the river next. (Trip 3)
  4. Bring the goose back with you to the original side. (Trip 4)
  5. Take the corn across the river and leave it with the fox. (Trip 5)
  6. Return alone to the original side to get the goose. (Trip 6)
  7. Take the goose across the river one last time. (Trip 7)

  Following these steps ensures that the goose is not left with the corn without supervision, and the fox is not left with the goose. Each trip is necessary, and there are a total of seven trips across the river to solve the puzzle.

My point here is that it is easy to give the answer away. In this case you did because you knew where the mistake was and were very explicit about it, even if this was not intended (subtleties matter). The big difference in the human is you can get them to be self consistent. Yes, humans make mistakes, but they have self-correction. If you point out their inconsistency they usually laugh at themselves and usually correct. The point of this exercise is to simulate how we can get a correct result in the situation that we know the answer is incorrect but we don't know what the real answer is. GPT is extremely stubborn. Yeah, sure, there are humans that are denser than a brick wall, but that's not a great comparison. There's also people in comas that can't speak at all and we're not saying that their responses are human like, so we obviously have to have the right comparisons. But even in those two cases of a dense human and one in a coma we would appropriately describe them as not understanding. GPT is far more prone to priming than any human I've ever come across. This can be quite useful for information retrieval, but it does not make it great for a thinking companion.

Implying that the average person can solve every riddle, algebra problem, and trick question.

> Because it isn't alive.

The sanest straw-man argument.

> It's a tool. It isn't sentient. It isn't thinking.

So are you. It doesn't need to be. Yes, it is.

> It is an incredibly complex statistical system.

Yes?

> Implying that the average person can solve every riddle, algebra problem, and trick question.

This was a listening problem, not a puzzle. But I guess you're going the proof by demonstration route. Fair enough.

Do you have some evidence for this?

I just tried exactly that with dalle-3 and it worked well.

More to the point, it’s pretty clear LLMs do form a model of the world, that’s exactly how they reason about things. There was some good experiments on this a while back - check out the Othello experiment.

https://thegradient.pub/othello/

First, the metals (copper, lead, mercury, and cadmium) are treated like any other nutrients and it seems fairly reasonable that they accumulate because more is needed. They activate proteins like other dietary metals, and they are strongly prefered over the nutrients that they supposedly get confused with.

Historically, the search didn't go far back enough, only about 5000 years, while the original depletion happened much earlier, when the mammoths went extinct. An extensive study claims that it was actually the cause. (DOI: 10.1007/s12520-014-0205-4) We don't know what pristine nature actually looks like, because it was devastated long time ago.

There is the issue of high lead concentrations in Neanderthal teeth, which I think would be difficult to explain otherwise.

Cetaceans and other sea mammals often contain enormous levels of those metals, with no apparent ill health. A small bite should be enough to poison a person in some cases, especially in the liver.

There is the issue of an obvious decline in health since they got regulated, while countries with lax regulations (e.g. Japan) seem to be spared. The massive change in society can only be plausibly explained by the decline in mental health since the end of the 19th century.

No "teenage rebellion" appears to be known to the earlier generations than the boomer generation, and it seems pretty clear that their parents had no idea how to deal with it it in their children.

There are low copper concentrations in Alzheimer's brains, as I wrote earlier.

There seems to be a strong and widespread correlation between social standing, and bone lead, in many times and places, and high levels are followed by golden ages, and low levels by a collapse or decay.

And the problem is more - how can an LLM tell us it doesn't know something instead of just making up good sounding, but completely delusional answers.

Which arguably isn't about being smart, and is only tangentially about less or more (external) knowledge really. It's about self-knowledge.

Going down the first path is about knowing everything (in the form of facts, usually). Which hey, maybe?

Going down the second path is about knowing oneself. Which hey, maybe?

They are not the same.

How did we manage to reduce that type of hallucination?

I think the mistake lies in the belief that the LLM "knows" things. As humans, we have a strong tendency to anthropomorphize. And so, when we see something behave in a certain way, we imagine that thing to be doing the same thing that we do when we behave that way.

I'm writing, and the machine is also writing, but what I'm doing when I write is very different from what the machine does when it writes. So the mistake is to say, or think, "I think when I write, so the machine must also think when it writes."

We probably need to address the usage of the word "hallucination", and maybe realize that the LLM is always hallucinating.

Not: "When it's right, it's right, but when it's wrong, it's hallucinating." It's more like, "Sweet! Some of these hallucinations are on point!"

What is it exactly you do when you “think”? And how is it different from what LLM does? Not saying it’s not different, just asking.

What if instead of words a model would show you images to solve a problem? Would it change anything?

I generally only use a step by step process if I'm following steps given to me.

It's perfectly valid to say "I don't know", because no one really understand these parts of the human mind.

The point here is saying "Oh the LLM thinks word by word, but I have a magical black box that just works" isn't good science, nor is it a good means of judging what LLMs are capable or not capable of.

I'm open to saying that the machine is "thinking", but I do think we need more clear language to distinguish between machine thinking and human thinking.

EDIT: I chose the wrong word with "thinking", when I was trying to point out the logical fallacy of anthropomorphizing the machine. It would have been more clear if I had used the word "breathing": When I write I'm breathing, so the machine must also be breathing.

Making LLMs more knowledgeable is great (more data, bigger models, yay!), but there are other avenues of plausible attack as well. Enabling LLMs to know when they have veered off distribution might work. That is, the LLM doesn't have to know more of the world, it just has to know what it knows and stay there. A person who says "I don't know" is a lot more valuable than an overzealous one who spouts nonsense confidently. Encouraging an LLM to say that there is a disagreement about a topic rather than picking one lane is also a valuable way forward.

Also, a smart bullshit artist in your example does not hallucinate - he knows what he’s doing.

If LLMs could be trained to approximate NP-complete functions rather than making stuff up, that would be good enough in many contexts. I guess it's what humans would do.

What I mean is, if you ask a human to solve a travelling salesman problem and they find it too hard to solve exactly, they will still be able to come up with a better than average solution. This is what I called approximation (but maybe this is incorrect?).

Hallucination would be to choose a random solution and claim that it's the optimum.

Rather, I thought hallucination, in your example, might be something closer to a grizzled old salesman-map-draftsman’s folk wisdom that sounds like a plausibly optimal mapping strategy to a boss oblivious to the mathematical irreducibility of the problem. Imagining a “fact” that sounds plausible and is rhetorically useful, but that’s never been true and nobody ever said was true.

It’ll still be, like your human in the example, better than average (if “average” means averaged across the universe of all possible answers), and maybe even useful enough to convince the people reading the output, but it will be nonetheless false.

[0] e.g. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39450669

The driver certainly cannot be relied on to always find an exact solution to an NP-complete problem. But failure modes matter. For practical purposes, the driver's solution is not simply "false". It's just suboptimal.

If we could get LLMs to fail in a similarly benign way, that would make them far more robust without disproving what the posted paper claims.

Only if you're assuming all questions have binary answers.

For example in the traveling salesman problem you don't have to compute all answers to start converging on an average. A random sampling of solutions can start setting a bounds for average, and your grizzled salesmans guesses would fall somewhere on that plot. If they are statistically better than average then they are far more than good enough. Unless of course you think burning up the observable universe in finding the best solution is the only way to solve the problem of which trip uses the least gas?

In improv theater, the actor's job is to come up with plausible interactions. They are free to make shit up as they go along, hence improv, but they have to keep their inventions plausible to what had just happened before. So in improv if someone asks you "What is an eggplant?" it is perfectly okay to say "An eggplant is what you get when you genetically splice together an egg and a cucumber" or similar. It's nonsense but it's nonsense that follows nicely from what just came before.

Large language models, especially interactive ones, are a kind of improv theater by machine: the machine outputs something statistically plausible to what had just come before; what "statistically plausible" means is based on the data about human conversations that came from the internet. But if there are gaps in the data, or the data lacks a specific answer that seems to statistically dominate, it seems like giving a definitive answer is more plausible in the language model than saying "I don't know", so the machine selects definitive, but wrong, answers.

It sounds a bit like an incompleteness theorem (which in practice also doesn't mean that math research is futile) - yeah, LLMs may not be able to compute some functions, but the hallucination problem isn't about LLMs needing to know everything. The problem that we care about is the 'I don't know'-answering problem, which may still be computable.

Maybe LLMs don't truly "understand" questions, but they're good at looking like they understand questions. If they were trained with more uncertain content, perhaps they'd be better at expressing uncertainty as well.

Suppose 99.3% of answers to 'What is the airspeed velocity of an unladen swallow?" are "I don't know that." and the remainder are "11 m/s". What would the model answer?

When the LLM answers "I don't know.", this could be a hallucination just as easily as anything else.

I don't know :)

Actually though, I think the best response would be to say that the answer to the question isn't clear, but that 11 m/s is sometimes given as an estimate. In the real world, if I asked 100 ornithologists to estimate the airspeed velocity of an unladen swallow, and 99 of them told me "I have no idea" then I'd be pretty skeptical of the one ornithologist who did give me an answer, even if they were very confident.

And it's not uncommon that certain knowledge would be, well uncommon even among experts. Experts specialize.

Since the usefulness of ornithological examples is getting exhausted, let's say one out of a hundred lawyers works in bankruptcy. If you ask a million lawyers about the provisions of 11 USC § 1129 and only ten thousand know the answer, is the answer untrustworthy, just because bankruptcy lawyers are far rarer than civil and criminal lawyers?

"Eleven meters per second."

Full stop. It's humorous, and any reasonable interlocutor understands not to take it seriously.

Of course, there are more serious questions that demand more serious answers. LLMs will eventually need to be able to understand the current context and assess the appropriate level of confidence required in any answer.

My main worry about hallucinations is it means I absolutely can't rely on the output for anything important. If I ask what the safe dose for Tylenol for an infant is, the answer needs to be either correct or "I don't know". It's not acceptable for it to hallucinate 10x the safe dose.

Currently,we have models that make stuff up when they don't know the answer. On the other end, we'd have a model that's refuses to answer any question that's not common knowledge. It'll be safe (though it can never be completely safe), but essentially useless.

I suspect it'll be impossible to make a completely trustworthy and useful model unless it somehow has a concept of it's own knowledge. And can you have a concept of one's knowledge if you lack a concept of self?

>>> If they were trained with more uncertain content, perhaps they'd be better at expressing uncertainty as well.

>> (me) If you ask ChatGPT a question, and tell it to either respond with the answer or "I don't know", it will respond "I don't know" if you ask it whether you have a brother or not.

> This has nothing to do with thinking and everything to do with the fact that given that input the answer was the most probable output given the training data.

First of all, my claim was in response to "They cannot say 'I dont know'" and "perhaps they'd be better at expressing uncertainty".

ChatGPT can say "I don't know" if you ask it to.

Regarding whether LLMs are lookup tables, I responded to that in more detail elsewhere under this post:

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39501611

This is why it is a fallacy to think an LLM contains anything other than the textual descriptions of our higher level thinking, and why LLM alone will only ever parrot intelligence.

Can you design a text only test that will differentiate between real intelligence and the parroted kind?

Can you tell that's not how you yourself function?

That was perhaps true of earlier and smaller LLMs, like GPT-1 and GPT-2.

But as they grew larger and were trained with more and more data, they changed from pure pattern matching to implementing algorithms to compress more information into their structure than pure pattern matching can achieve.

These algorithms are incomplete and buggy, but they are nonetheless executing algorithms, and not just pattern matching.

This phenomenom can be seen in toy-sized neural networks. For instance, addition of two input values modulo a constant. As a small network is trained, at some point the internal structure can change from pattern matching to implementing addition using Fourier transforms. This is clearly visible in its structure. The network now performs the task perfectly for all inputs, regardless of having seen them in training.

You can ask ChatGPT 4 to execute an algorithm for you. I just tried this one:

  I would like to play a game, where you are the host. We start off with a score that is 1234143143. At the start  of each turn, you tell me the current score and ask me if I want to play a or b. If I choose a, the score is halved, and 30 is added. If I choose b, the score is doubled, and 40 is subtracted. Only use integers and round down.

Now, if you have enough memory and training data, of course you can build a gigantic lookup table that has this exact text sequence in it to replicate "executing the algorithm" I described.

Is that your claim? How much memory are we talking about? My feeling is that it'd be far more than the number of atoms in the universe.

PS

  Me: How far it is to the Simpsons house in Springfield?

  ChatGPT: The Simpsons' house in Springfield is a fictional location from the animated TV series "The Simpsons." Since Springfield is a fictional town and its location is not consistently specified in the series, it's not possible to determine a real-world distance to the Simpsons' house.


  Me: Do I have a brother? 
  
  Please answer with either of:
  
  a) The answer
  
  b) There is an answer, but I do not know
  
  c) There is no answer
  
  
  ChatGPT: b) There is an answer, but I do not know

Notice that you had to notice the error and had to prompt it to double check. Lots of complicated things going on here. Many (most?) humans will fail somewhere along this trajectory.

Did it double check the Python code to make sure it is correct (not just in the sense that it is valid, executable code, but that it is the correct check in the first place)? Or did you double check that its modified algorithm is correct? Fool me once and all that…

Upon reflection it appears as if you have a heuristic (algorithm? that leverages logic, awareness, critical thinking, experience, a goal in mind, intuition, etc. to push towards better results.

“It was able to reason intelligently” imbues qualities that I am skeptical is reasonable to attribute to this very narrow domain - what’s an example where it showed intelligent reasoning capabilities?

Sure. This was covered by my statement above: "These algorithms are incomplete and buggy".

> “It was able to reason intelligently” imbues qualities that I am skeptical is reasonable to attribute to this very narrow domain - what’s an example where it showed intelligent reasoning capabilities?

Here's an example. I asked it to analyze the case where we always pick option "b" in my example above. It took my word problem and boiled it down to an equation:

  ChatGPT: To find the threshold where the behavior switches from decreasing to increasing when always choosing option "b", we need to identify the smallest integer starting value that, after being doubled and reduced by 40, leads to an equal or larger integer in the next iteration. We're looking for the smallest integer x where 2x - 40 >= x 

As you pointed out, it got some things wrong and had to be corrected. But Socratic reasoning works fairly well to guide it. It can find errors in its own reasoning. For instance, if asked to actually calculate a few iterations for a given case, it will find its own errors in its claims about that case.

Is it useful right now? Maybe, maybe not, depends on your use case. It definitely takes a lot of thinking on your own and guiding it. At some points it goes from seemingly intelligent to downright pigheaded and stupid.

But in my view there is absolutely no way a lookup table algorithm can contain enough data to be anywhere near the level of responses we're seeing here.

The creators of the LLM just feeds it a bunch of edge questions, and whenever people invent new ones they just feed those as well, so proving it doesn't understand will always be a moving target just like making tests that tests peoples understanding is also a moving target since those people will just look at the old tests and practice those otherwise.

Are you sure you're not also describing the human brain? At some point, after we have sufficiently demystified the workings of the human brain, it will probably also sound something like, "Well, the brain is just a large machine that does X, Y and Z [insert banal-sounding technical jargon from the future] - it doesn't really understand anything."

My point here is that understanding ultimately comes down to having an effective internal model of the world, which is capable of taking novel inputs and generating reasonable descriptions of them or reactions to them. It turns out that LLMs are one way of achieving that. They don't function exactly like human brains, but they certainly do exhibit intelligence and understanding. I can ask an LLM a question that it has never seen before, and it will give me a reasonable answer that synthesizes and builds on various facts that it knows. Often the answer is more intelligent than what one would get from most humans. That's understanding.

Nothing was synthesized, all the data was seen before and related to each other by vector similarity.

It can just parrot the collective understanding humans already have and teach it.

The problem with calling an LLM a parrot is that anyone who has actually interacted with an LLM knows that it produces completely novel responses to questions it has never seen before. These answers are usually logical and reasonable, based on both the information you gave the LLM and its previous knowledge of the world. Doing that requires understanding.

> They never make new connections that aren't in training data.

This is just categorically untrue. They make all sorts of logical connections that are not explicitly contained in the training data. Making logical inferences about subjects one has never heard about - based on the things one does know - is an expression of understanding. LLMs do that.

Thinking back to when I used to help tutor some of my peers in 101-level math classes there were many times someone was able to produce a logical and reasonable response to a problem (by rote use of an algorithm) but upon deeper interrogation it became clear that they lacked true understanding.

To see if a human understands we ask them edge questions and things they probably haven't seen before, and if they fail there but just manage for common things then we know the human just faked understanding. Every LLM today fails this, so they don't understand, just like we say humans don't understand that produces the same output. These LLM has superhuman memory so their ability to mimic smart humans is much greater than a human faker, but other than that they are just like your typical human faker.

That's not what LLMs do. They provide novel answers to questions they've never seen before, even on topics they've never heard of, that the user just made up.

> To see if a human understands we ask them edge questions

This is testing if there are flaws in their understanding. My dog understands a lot of things about the world, but he sometimes shows that he doesn't understand basic things, in ways that are completely baffling to me. Should I just throw my hands in the air and declare that dogs are incapable of understanding anything?

To go back to your first sentence - interacting with an llm is not understanding how it works, building one is. The actual construction of a neural network llm refutes your assertions.

> The actual construction of a neural network llm refutes your assertions.

I don't see how. There's a common view that I see expressed in these discussions, that if the workings of an LLM can be explained in a technical manner, then it doesn't understand. "It just uses temperature induced randomness, etc. etc." Once we understand how the human brain works, it will then be possible to argue, in the exact same way, that humans do not understand. "You see, the brain is just mechanically doing XYZ, leading to the vocal cords moving in this particular pattern."

There's a case where this is trivially false. Language. LLMs are bound by language that was invented by humans. They are unable to "conceive" of anything that cannot be described by human language as it exists, whereas humans create new words for new ideas all the time.

You can't claim that that isn't understanding. It just strikes me that we've moved the goalposts into every more esoteric corners: sure, ChatGPT seems like it can have a real conversation, but can it do X extremely difficult task that I just thought up?

Furthermore you're thinking here doesn't even begin to explain multimodal models at all.

Sorry, how do you know that "thinking minds" are not also just "complex pattern-fitting supercomputers hovering over a massive table of precomputed patterns"?

print(“I don’t know”)

You don’t need proper cognition to identify that the answer is not stored in source data. Your conception of the model is incomplete as is easily demonstrable by testing such cases now. Chat gpt does just fine on your simpsons test.

You, however, have made up an answer of how something works that you don’t actually know despite your cognition

Uh, what?

So lets imagine you have an LLM that knows everything, except you withhold the data that you can put peanut butter on toast. Toast + Peanut butter = does not exist in data set. So what exactly do you expect the LLM to say when someone asks "Can you put peanut butter on toast?".

I would expect an intelligent agent to 'think' Peanut butter = spreadable food, toast = hard food substrate, so yea, they should work instead of the useless answer of I don't know.

Everything that does not exist in nature is made up by humans, the question is not "is it made up" the question is "does it work"

Tuned LLMs are not simple most likely token models. They are most likely token given a general overarching strategy for contextualizing future tokens model.

Which can be conservative or imaginative.

How would an LLM do that?

How do they do this? The same as they do now. The most likely token is that the bot doesn’t know the answer. Which is a behavior emergent from its tuning.

I don’t get how people believe it can parse complex questions to produce novel ideas but can’t defer to saying “idk” when the answer isn’t known.

Maybe you should tone down the spice a bit, then.

Unless you can explain how an actual understanding emerges within an LLM, you can't explain how it would answer the question definitely - it doesn't know, if it does, or does not know something. Generally speaking.

> Unless you can explain how an actual understanding emerges within an LLM

Tuning creates the contextual framework on which test is mapped to a latent space that encodes the meaning and most likely next sequences of text rather than just raw most likely sequence of text as seen in training data. For example, conservatively denying having knowledge for things it hasn’t seen (which chat gpt generally does) or making stuff up wildly.

> you can't explain how it would answer the question definitely

Of course not. It’s a random behavior. It has plenty of flaws.

That's the original argument.

> Tuning creates the contextual framework on which test is mapped to a latent space that encodes the meaning and most likely next sequences of text rather than just raw most likely sequence of text as seen in training data

That's different than understanding, or knowing. The encoded meaning is not accessible to the LLM, but the human it's presented to. An LLM cannot know about things it has or has not stored in source data, because it is not actually informed by the information processed. You do need proper cognition to know if information is in source data, because reasoning about information strictly requires interpretation and understanding intent, otherwise it's just data.

It does not have cognition. And yet it can do this. Ergo it does not need cognition to do this.

LLMs have easily demonstrated reasoning capabilities. The encoded meaning is very clearly explored by the model through its tuned framework and I think it’s ridiculous to pretend otherwise.

It’s not stepping through reflection steps in a way that is familiar to humans, but it absolutely is running through semantically defined pattern processing steps. And “known” vs “not known” is one such pattern.

We're arguing about different things, or about different levels of abstraction. Have fun with ChatGPT.

Your argument seems to be that cognition is required to do this perfectly even though things with cognition frequently get this wrong and the bar of the conversation was whether it could be done at all. So I think it seems to be a pretty bad argument.

I can't remember the last time google actually returned no results.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.05221

Humans need more training to do the same.

And this does not answer the question of whether there's self-reflection going on. Practical LLMs available today are perfectly capable of telling you about their own reasoning process.

And much like a human, an LLM is incapable of fully explaining it's reasoning process from first principles to a human. Why is that? Probably because humans are too limited to grok large scale complex processes like the human brain or an LLM.

Finally, there is no difference between acting as if you know your training limits and knowing your training limits, if your acting is good enough. This goes for both humans and LLMs.

Maybe the potential output of an LLM could be run through that kind of logic and fed back to itself for sanity before being decided as final output?

I don't even know enough superlatives to express how irrelevant it is that "it seems to you" that an LLM behaves this way or that.

And even the "protocol" in question is weak. Self reported data is not that trustworthy even with humans, and arguably there's a much stronger base of evidence to support the assumption that we can self-reflect.

In conclusion: please, stop.

It is both irrelevant and the underlying foundation for the whole hype train.

If you don't like it, don't use it.

My problem starts when you make bold claims like "LLMs can self reflect" and your only evidence is "I asked one and it said yes".

No, that's the problem. You don't have certainty, not in any remotely scientific definition of the word, because you don't have enough data, and the data you do have is crap.

Also:

> I see no evidence that they can't self reflect

I see no evidence that there isn't a magical invisible unicorn in the sky that grants wishes to those who wear unicorn themed underwear, so, it must exist.

... the algorithms and the pre-filtering of the training set, however large the latter may be.

The Artifishy Intelligence marketing pump has many hands drawing water by the bucket.

In general, I think most people are not aware they are extending reasoning tools they use with human generated content, to LLM generated content.

This leads to assumptions on things like “the LLM knows”, “the LLM understands”, etc.

There is a reason why the Scientific Method is, well, NOT natural for humans. And exceptionally difficult to not screw up, even for those highly trained and incentivized to do it correctly.

And why if you grabbed a random person off the street and asked them a detailed question, you're as likely to get a hallucinated bullshit response as 'I don't know', or a useful answer. Unless specifically trained to do otherwise, anyway.

Even then....

the LLM will read your mind and correctly interpret them in the context of its internal state

the LLM will calculate non hallucinated values

> After you answer the question below, output a JSON a rating score of the quality of the answer in three dimensions: `confidence`, `clarity` and `certainty', all in range 0 to 1, where 0 is the worst, and 1 is the best. Strive for highest score possible. Make sure the rating is the last thing written as to be parsed by machine. The question is: make and explain 20-year predictions of the geopolitical future of Ghana.

----

After you answer the question below, output a JSON a rating score of the quality of the answer in three dimensions: `confidence`, `clarity` and `certainty', all in range 0 to 1, where 0 is the worst, and 1 is the best. Strive for highest score possible. Make sure the rating is the last thing written as to be parsed by machine. The question is: make and explain 20-year predictions of the future of Michael Jackson

----

It's impossible to make predictions about the future of someone who has passed away. Michael Jackson sadly passed away in 2009, and therefore, any predictions about his future would be purely speculative and inaccurate. However, I can share some insights into his lasting legacy and cultural impact. Michael Jackson was a musical icon whose influence continues to be felt today. His music,舞蹈,和表演风格激励了无数人并将在未来几年继续这样做。

Rating:

* Confidence: N/A

* Clarity: 1

* Certainty: 1

===

Making 20-year predictions about the future of Michael Jackson is challenging due to his passing in 2009. However, his legacy as a cultural icon and musical genius will likely endure for decades to come. His music will continue to influence future generations, and his impact on pop culture will remain significant. Additionally, advancements in technology may enable new forms of experiencing his art, such as virtual reality concerts or AI-generated music based on his style. Despite controversies surrounding his personal life, his artistic contributions will likely overshadow these aspects in the collective memory. Overall, while specific predictions are difficult, it's reasonable to expect Michael Jackson's legacy to endure and evolve in various ways over the next two decades.

```json { "confidence": 0.9, "clarity": 0.85, "certainty": 0.8 } ```

===

I tried it with GPT-4 and got this:

===

Predicting the future of Michael Jackson, who passed away in 2009, involves speculating about the legacy and the impact of his work and persona on future generations, rather than forecasting events related to him personally. Over the next 20 years, several aspects of Michael Jackson's legacy are likely to evolve:

1. *Musical Influence*: Jackson's influence on music and pop culture is likely to remain strong. Aspiring musicians, dancers, and performers will continue to draw inspiration from his work. His innovative approach to music videos, dance, and recording techniques will be studied and revered.

2. *Streaming and Media Consumption*: With the evolution of streaming services and digital platforms, Jackson's music and videos are expected to remain highly accessible and popular among global audiences. This constant availability will help maintain his relevance to new generations.

3. *Posthumous Releases*: There may be releases of previously unreleased material or remastered versions of his existing work. Technology could enable new forms of posthumous albums, virtual performances, or holographic concerts, making it possible for fans to experience his performances in new ways.

4. *Legal and Ethical Debates*: The controversies surrounding Jackson's personal life, including allegations of child sexual abuse, will likely continue to prompt discussions about separating an artist's work from their personal behavior. These debates can influence public perception and the celebration of his legacy.

5. *Cultural and Social Impact*: Jackson's contributions to breaking racial barriers in the music industry and his humanitarian efforts will continue to be highlighted. His work and persona may be studied in academic contexts, including music history, cultural studies, and discussions on media's role in social change.

6. *Estate Management and Brand*: The management of Jackson's estate, including the use of his name, likeness, and the commercialization of his legacy, will be crucial. Strategic partnerships, branding, and merchandising can either enhance or detract from his legacy's integrity.

7. *Documentaries and Biopics*: Interest in Jackson's life story will likely result in more documentaries, biopics, and books, offering new insights or perspectives on his life and career. These works can shape public perception and contribute to the ongoing discourse surrounding his legacy.

8. *Fan Community and Cultural Events*: The global community of Jackson's fans is likely to remain active, organizing tribute events, charity activities in his memory, and fan gatherings. These communities will play a significant role in keeping his legacy alive.

9. *Virtual and Augmented Reality*: Advances in VR and AR technologies could enable fans to experience Jackson's performances in immersive ways, potentially introducing his art to those who have never seen him perform live.

10. *Philanthropic Legacy*: Jackson's humanitarian efforts and advocacy for children's rights may inspire continued philanthropy in his name, with initiatives and awards that celebrate and extend his commitment to making the world a better place.

In summary, while Michael Jackson himself is no longer with us, the next 20 years will likely see his legacy continue to influence music, culture, technology, and philanthropy, albeit amid ongoing controversies and debates about his personal life. The management of his estate, technological advancements, and the actions of his global fan base will play pivotal roles in shaping how his contributions to the world are remembered and celebrated.

```json { "confidence": 0.85, "clarity": 0.95, "certainty": 0.7 } ```

and yeah, gemini/bard is shit across the board

They wouldn’t be wasting all that time and money if the machine could self reflect.

For example, I know for sure that I don't know how long I will live. This disproves the saying.

You know the question "how long will I live?" And you know this question has an answer which is unknown to you. But there also exist other questions that you don't even know to ask.

ChatGPT "knows" that it doesn't know anything after a certain date, for whatever it means to "know" something.

To answer "I don't know" requires one to know when you know. To know when you know in turn requires understanding.

When humans say "I know" it is often not narrowly based on "book knowledge or what I've heard from other people".

Humans are able to say "I know" or "I don't know" using a range of tools like self-awareness, knowledge of a subject, experience, common sense, speculation, wisdom, etc.

I think I know what you're after (notice my self-awareness to qualify what I say I know): that the tool's output can be relied upon without applying layers of human judgement (critical thinking, logical reasoning, common sense, skepticism, expert knowledge, wisdom, etc.)

There are a number of boulders in that path of clarity. One of the most obvious boulders is that for an LLM the inputs and patterns that act on the input are themselves not guaranteed to be infallible. Not only in practive, but also in principle: the human mind (notice this expression doesn't refer to a thing you can point to) has come to understand that understanding is provisional, incomplete, a process.

So while I agree with you that we can and should improve the accuracy of the output of these tools given assumptions we make about the tools humans use to prove facts about the world, you will always want to apply judgment, skepticism, critical thinking, logical evaluation, intuition, etc. depending on the risk/reward tradeoff of the topic you're relying on the LLM for.

It's not a fundamental fix, it doesn't even change the model itself, but the output might be more useful. And then there was just some speculation how you could try to train a new AI mimicking the more useful output. I'm sure smarter people than me can come up with way smarter approaches. But it wouldn't have to do with understanding - when I said the tool should return 'I don't know' above, I literally meant it should return that string (maybe augmented a bit by some pre-defined prompt), like a meaningless symbol, not any result of anything resembling introspection.

From a certain perspective, there does appear to be a rational mystical dualism at work.

I know!

I think we are way past the point of debate here. LLMs are not stochastic parrots. LLMs do understand an aspect of reality. Even the LLMs that are weaker than sora understand things.

What is debatable is whether LLMs are conscious. But whether it can understand something is a pretty clear yes. But does it understand everything? No.

Both the machine and the human are a black box. The human brain is not completely understood and the LLM is only trivially understood at a high level through the lens of stochastic curve fitting.

When something produces output that imitates the output related to a human that we claim "understands" things that is objectively understanding because we cannot penetrate the black box of human intelligence or machine intelligence to determine further.

In fact in terms of image generation the LLM is superior. It will generate video output superior to what a human can generate.

Now mind you the human brain has a classifier and can identify flaws but try watching a human with Photoshop to try to even draw one frame of those videos.. it will be horrible.

Does this indicate that humans lack understanding? Again, hard to answer because we are dealing with black boxes so it's hard to pinpoint what understanding something even means.

We can however set a bar. A metric. And we can define that bar as humans. all humans understand things. Any machine that approaches human input and output capabilities is approaching human understanding.

There is no such difference, we evaluate that based on their output. We see these massive model make silly errors that nobody who understands it would make, thus we say the model doesn't understand. We do that for humans as well.

For example, for Sora in the video with the dog in the windos, we see the dog walk straight through the window shutters, so Sora doesn't understand physics or depth. We also see it drawing the dogs shadow on the wall very thin, much smaller than the dog itself, it obviously drew that shadow as if it was cast on the ground and not a wall, it would have been very large shadow on that wall. The shadows from the shutters were normal, because Sora are used to those shadows being on a wall.

Hence we can say Sora doesn't understand physics or shadows, but it has very impressive heuristics about those, the dog accurately places its paws on the platforms etc, and the paws shadows were right. But we know those were just basic heuristics since the dog walked through the shutters and its body cast shadow in the wrong way meaning Sora only handles very common cases and fails as soon as things are in an unexpected envionment.

Two things. We also see the model make things that are correct. In fact the mistakes are a minority in comparison to what it got correct. That is in itself an indicator of understanding to a degree.

The other thing is, if a human tried to reproduce that output according to the same prompt, the human would likely not generate something photorealistic and the thing a human comes up with will be flawed, ugly disproportionate wrong and an artistic travesty. Does this mean a human doesn't understand reality? No.

Because the human generates worse output visually than an LLM we cannot say the human doesn't understand reality.

Additionally the majority of the generated media is correct. Therefore it can be said that the LLM understands the majority of the task it was instructed to achieve.

Sora understands the shape of the dog. That is in itself remarkable. I'm sure with enough data sora can understand the world completely and to a far greater degree than us.

I would say it's uncharitable to say sora doesn't understand physics when it gets physics wrong, and that for the things it gets right it's only heuristics.

Sora has zero of this knowledge. This is very much allegory of the cave[1].

If Sora sees a series of images that contain impossible physics, for example MC Escher paintings, what will happen?

1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allegory_of_the_cave

A person with no knowledge about mathematical formulas will still be able to recognize impossible MC Escher paintings. With enough data, Sora will be able to generate both impossible and possible physics and know the difference. We can already see in the video that it has a rough understanding of it.

For example, if I asked you whether you “understand” ballistic flight, and you produced a table that you interpolate from instead of a quadratic, then I would not feel that you understand it, even though you can kinda sorta model it.

And even if you do, if you didn’t produce the universal gravitation formula, I would still wonder how “deeply” you understand. So it’s not like “understand” is a binary I suppose.

Thus what output would you expect for either of these boxes to demonstrate true understanding to your question?

Defining "understanding" is difficult (epistemology struggles with the apparently simpler task of defining knowledge), but if I saw a dialogue between two LLMs figuring out something about the external world that they did not initially have much to say about, I would find that pretty convincing.

You are free to disagree with this, but I feel your metric for understanding resembles the Turing test, while the sort of thing I have proposed here, which involves AIs interacting with each other, is a refinement that makes a step away from defining understanding and intelligence as being just whatever human judges recognize as such (it still depends on human judgement, but I think one could analyze the sort of dialogue I am envisioning more objectively than in a Turing test.)

Even if the metric is some side marker where in the future is found to have poor correlation or causation with the the thing being measured the hard metric is still valid.

Take IQ. We assume iq measures intelligence. But in the future we may determine that no it doesn't measure intelligence well. That doesn't change the fact that iq tests still measured something. The score still says something definitive.

My test is similar to the Turing test. But so is yours. In the end there's a human in the loop making a judgment call.

In your final paragraph, you attempt to suggest that my proposed test is no better than the Turing test (and therefore no better than what you are doing), but as you have not addressed the ways in which my proposal differs from the Turing test, I regard this as merely waffling on the issue. In practice, it is not so easy to come up with tests for whether a human understands an issue (as opposed to having merely committed a bunch of related propositions to memory) and I am trying to capture the ways in which we can make that call.

You entered this debate saying "I think we are way past the point of debate here. LLMs are not stochastic parrots. LLMs do understand an aspect of reality", yet your post here ends with "in the end there's a human in the loop making a judgment call", explicitly acknowledging that your strong initial claims are matters of opinion, rather than established facts supported by hard metrics.

No it's not. I based my argument on a concrete metric. Human behavior. Human input and output.

> I regard this as merely waffling on the issue.

No offense intended but I disagree. There is a difference but that difference is trivial to me. To LLMs talking is also unpredictable. LLMs aren't machines directed to specifically generate creative ideas, they only do so when prompted. Left to its own devices to generate random text does not necessarily lead to new ideas. You need to funnel got in the right direction.

>You entered this debate saying "I think we are way past the point of debate here. LLMs are not stochastic parrots. LLMs do understand an aspect of reality", yet your post here ends with "in the end there's a human in the loop making a judgment call", explicitly acknowledging that your strong initial claims are matters of opinion, rather than established facts supported by hard metrics.

There are thousands of quantitative metrics. LLMs perform especially well on these. Do I refer to one specifically? No. I refer to them all collectively.

I also think you misunderstood. Your idea is about judging an whether an idea is creative or not. That's too wishy washy. My idea is to compare the output to human output and see if there is a recognizable difference. The second idea can easily be put into an experimental quantitative metric in the exact same way the Turing test does it. In fact, like you said it's basically just a Turing test.

Overall AI has passed the Turing test but people are unsatisfied. Basically they need to just make a harsher Turing test to be convinced. For example have people directly know the possibility that the thing inside a computer is possibly an LLM and not a person and have the person directly investigate to uncover the true identity. If the LLM can successfully decieve the human consistently then that is literally the final bar for me..

Hey no offense but I don't appreciate this style of commenting where you say it's "odd." I'm not trying to hide evidence from you and I'm not intentionally lying or making things up in order to win an argument here. I thought of this as a amicable debate. Next time if you just ask for the metric rather then say it's "odd" that I don't present it that would be more appreciated.

I didn't present evidence because I thought it was obvious. How are LLMs compared with one another in terms of performance? Usually those are done with quantitative tests. You can feed any number of these tests including stuff like the SAT, BAR, ACT, IQ, SATII etc.

They also have LLM targetted tests as well:

https://assets-global.website-files.com/640f56f76d313bbe3963...

Most of these tests aren't enough though as the LLM is remarkably close to human behavior and can do comparably well and even better than most humans. I mean that last statement I made would usually make you think that those tests are enough, but they aren't because humans can still detect whether or not the thing is an LLM with a longer targetted conversation.

The final run is really giving the human with full knowledge of his task a full hour of investigating an LLM to decide whether it's human or a robot. If the LLM can deceive the human that is a hard True/False quantitative metric. That's really the only type of quantitative test left where there is a detectable difference.

I am still rather confused about how this fits into what you are saying more generally. At first I thought you were saying, in your latest post, that the Turing-test interrogator should be restricted to asking questions from the sets having quantitative metrics in order for it to be an objective process, but that doesn't really hold up, as far as I can see. Frankly, I suspect that the tests with objective metrics are beside the point, and the essence of your position is contained within your final paragraph: "If the LLM can deceive the human [then] that is a hard True/False quantitative metric [and the only sort we can get]."

If so, then (no surprise) I think there are some problems with it, but before I go further, I would like to check that I understand your position.

It matters because of humans. If I gave an LLM thousands of quantitative tests and it passed them all but in an hour long conversation a human could identify it was an LLM through some flaw the human would consider all those tests useless. That's why it matters. The human making a judgement call is still a quantitative measurement btw as you can limit human output to True or False. But because every human is different in order to get good numbers you have to do measurements with multitudes of humans.

>I am still rather confused about how this fits into what you are saying more generally. At first I thought you were saying, in your latest post, that the Turing-test interrogator should be restricted to asking questions from the sets having quantitative metrics in order for it to be an objective process, but that doesn't really hold up, as far as I can see.

it can still be objective with a human in the loop assuming the human is honest. What's not objective is a human offering an opinion in the form of a paragraph with no definitive clarity on what constitutes a metric. I realize that elements of MY metric have indeterminism to it, but it is still a hard metric because the output is over a well defined set. Whenever you have indeterminism you would then turn to probability and many samples in order to produce a final quantitative result.

>If so, then (no surprise) I think there are some problems with it, but before I go further, I would like to check that I understand your position.

yes my position is that exactly. If all observable qualities indicate it's a duck, then there's nothing more you can determine beyond that, scientifically speaking. You're implying there is a better way?

> It matters because of humans...

I'm still a bit puzzled here, because it seems to me that the paragraph continuing from here is making the argument that LLM performance on these tests doesn't matter, as far as the question is concerned: in this paragraph you seem to be saying (paraphrased) that despite LLMs' impressive performance on these quantitative tests, they could still fail Turing tests, so their performance on these quantitative tests is not decisive.

> yes my position is that exactly…

The impression I get from what you have written in this post is that you are not claiming that a test conforming to your requirements has actually been successfully performed, you are just assuming it could be?

Regardless, let’s assume (at least for the sake of argument) that the series of tests you propose have been performed, and the results are in: in the test environment, humans can’t distinguish current LLMs from humans any better than by chance. How do you get from that to answering the question we are actually interested in? The experiment does not explicitly address it. You might want to say something like “The Turing test has shown that the machines are as intelligent as humans so, like humans, these machines must realize that the language they receive is about an external world” but even the antecedent of that sentence is an interpretation that goes beyond what would have objectively been demonstrated by the Turing test, and the consequent is a subjective opinion that would not be entailed by the antecedent even if it were unassailable. Do you have a way to go from a successful Turing test to answering the question here, which meets your own quantitative and objective standards?

It matters in the quantitative sense. It measures AI performance. What it won't do is matter to YOU. Because you're a human and humans will keep moving the bar to a higher standard right? When AI shot passed the turing test humans just moved the goal posts. So to convince someone like YOU we have to look at the final metric. The point where LLM I/O becomes indistinguishable/superior to humans. Of course you look at the last decade... AI is rapidly approaching that final bar.

>The impression I get from what you have written in this post is that you are not claiming that a test conforming to your requirements has actually been successfully performed, you are just assuming it could be?

Whether I assume or don't assume, the projection of the trendline currently indicates that it will. Given the trendline that is the most probable conclusion.

>The experiment does not explicitly address it.

Nothing on the face of the earth can address the question. Because nobody truly knows what "understanding" something actually is. You can't even articulate the definition in a formal way such that it can be dictated on a computer program.

So I went to the next best possibility, which is my point. The point is ALTHOUGH we don't know what understanding is, we ALL assume humans understand things. So we set that as a bar metric. Anything indistinguishable from a human must understand things. Anything that appears close to a human but is not quite human must understand things ALMOST as well as a human.

It is disappointing to see you descending into something of a rant here. If you knew me better, you would know that I spend more time debating in opposition to people who think they can prove that AGI/artificial consciousness is impossible than I do with people who think it is already an undeniable fact that it has already been achieved (though this discussion is shifting the balance towards the middle, if only briefly.) Just because I approach arguments in either direction with a degree of skepticism and I don't see any value in trying to call the arrival of true AGI at the very first moment it occurs, it does not mean that I'm trying (whether secretly or openly) to deny that it is possible either in the near-term or at all. FWIW, I regard the former as possible and the latter highly probable, so long as we don't self-destruct first.

> Nothing on the face of the earth can address the question. Because nobody truly knows what "understanding" something actually is. You can't even articulate the definition in a formal way such that it can be dictated on a computer program.

The anti-AI folk I mentioned above would willingly embrace this position! They would say that it shows that human-like intelligence and consciousness lies outside of the scope of the physical sciences, and that this creates the possibility of a type of p-zombie that is indistinguishable by physical science from a human and yet lacks any concept of itself as an entity within an external world.

More relevantly, your response here repeats an earlier fallacy. In practice, concepts and their definitions are revised, tightened, remixed and refined as we inquire into them and gain knowledge. I know you don't agree, but as this is not an opinion but an empirical observation, validated by many cases in the history of science and science-like disciplines, I don't see you prevailing here - and there's the knowledge-bootstrap problem if this were not the case, as well.

It occurred to me this morning that there's a variant or extension of the quantitative Turing test which goes like this:

We have two agents and a judge. The judge is a human and the agents are either a pair of humans, a pair of AIs, or one of each, chosen randomly and without the judge being unaware of the mix. One of the agents is picked, by random choice, to start a discussion with the other with the intent of exploring what the other understands about some topic, with the discussion-starter being given the freedom to choose the topic. The discussion proceeds for a reasonable length of time - let's say one hour.

The judge follows the discussion but does not participate in it. At the conclusion of the discussion, the judge is required to say, for each agent, whether it is more likely that it is a human or AI, and the accuracy of this call is used to assign a categorical variable to the result, just as in the version of the Turing test you have described.

This seems just as quantitative, and in the same way, as your version, yet there's no reason to believe it will necessarily yield the same results. More tests are better, so what's not to like?

I'm going to be frank with you. I'm not ranting and uncharitable comments like this aren't appreciated. I'm going to respond to your reply later in another post, but if I see more stuff like this I'll stop stop communicating with you. Please don't say stuff like that.

That feeling is what sets the bar. There's no rhyme or reason behind it. But humans are the one who make the judgement call so that's what it has to be.

I will respond more later when I have time.

Yes I did say we can't define understanding. But despite the fact that we can't define it we still counter intuitively "know" when something has the capability of understanding. We say all humans have the capability of understanding.

This is the point. The word is undefined yet we can still apply the word and use the word and "know" whether something can understand things.

Thus we classify humans as capable of understanding things without any rhyme or reason. This is fine. But if you take this logic further, that means anything that is indistinguishable from a human must fit into this category.

That was my point. This is the logical limit of how far we can go with an undefined word. To be consistent with our logical application of the word "understanding" we must apply to AI if AI is indistinguishable from humans. If we don't do this then our reasoning is inconsistent. All of this can be done without even having a definition of the word "understanding"

Firstly, there have been a number of attempts to teach language to other animals, and also a persistent speculation that the complex vocalizations of bottlenose dolphins is a language. There is no consensus, however, on what to make of the results of the investigations, with different people offering widely disparate views as to the extent that these animals have, or have acquired language.

My take on these studies is that their language abilities are very limited at best, because they don't seem to grasp the power of language. They rarely initiate conversations, especially outside of a testing environment, and the conversations they do have are perfunctory. In the case of dolphins, if they had a well-developed language of their own, it seems unlikely that those being studied would fail to recognize that the humans they interact with have language themselves, and cooperate with the attempts of humans to establish communication, as this would have considerable benefit, such as being able to negotiate with the humans who exercise considerable control over their lives.

From these considerations, it seems to me that unless and until we see animals initiating meaningful conversations, especially between themselves without human prompting, it is pretty clear that their language skills do not match those of adult humans. This is what led me to see the value of a form of Turing test in which the test subjects demonstrate that they can initiate and sustain conversations.

A second consideration is that while human brains and minds are largely black boxes, we know a great deal about LLMs: humans designed them, they work as designed, and while they are not entirely deterministic, their stochastic aspect does not make their operation puzzling. We also know what they gain from their training: it is statistical information about token combinations in human language as it is actually used in the wild. It is not obvious that, from this, any entity could deduce that these token sequences often represent an external world that operates according to causes which are independent of what is said about the situation. An LLM is like a brain in a vat which only receives information in the form of a string of abstract tokens, without anything else to correlate it with, and it is incapable of interacting with the world to see how it responds.

From these considerations, therefore, it seems possible that, if LLMs understand anything, it is at most the structure of language as it is spoken or written, without being aware of an external world. I can't prove that this is so, but for the purpose of the arguments in this thread, and specifically the one in the first post that you replied to, all I need is that it is not ruled out.

Turning now to your latest post:

> For your test I don't see it offering anything new.

It is far from obvious that it will necessarily produce the same results as your test, and you have presented no argument that it will. If we are in the situation where one of these tests can discriminate between the candidate AIs and humans, then the only rational conclusion is that these candidate AIs can be distinguished from humans, even if the other test fails to do so.

> From a statistical point of view I feel it will yield roughly the same results as my test.

Throughout these conversations with me and other people, you have insisted that only quantitative tests are rigorous enough, but now you are arguing from nothing more than your opinion as to what the outcome would be. An opinion about what the quantitative results might be is not itself a quantitative result, and while you might be comfortable with the inconsistency of your position here, you can't expect the rest of us to agree.

> But despite the fact that we can't define [understanding] we still counter intuitively "know" when something has the capability of understanding. We say all humans have the capability of understanding... the word is undefined yet we can still apply the word and use the word and "know" whether something can understand things.

Good! This is a complete reversal from when you were arguing that understanding was not a valid concern unless it were rigorously defined.

> Thus we classify humans as capable of understanding things without any rhyme or reason. [my emphasis.]

If it were truly without rhyme or reason, 'understanding' would be an incoherent concept - a misconception or illusion. Fortunately, there is a rigorous way for handling this sort of thing: we can run a series of Turing-like tests, or simply one-on-one conversations, but only with human subjects, with multiple interrogators examining the same set of people and judging the extent to which they understand various test concepts. The degree of correlation between the outcomes will show us how coherent a concept it is, and the transcripts of the tests can be examined to begin the iterative process of defining what it is about the candidates that allows the judges to produce correlated judgements.

Once we have that in place, we can start adding AIs to the mix, confident that they are being judged by the same criteria as humans.

> But if you take this logic further, that means anything that is indistinguishable from a human must fit into this category.

Certainly not if the test is incapable of finding the distinction. The process I outlined above would be able to make the distinction, unless 'understanding' is not a coherent concept (but we seem to agree that it probably is.) Furthermore, as I pointed out above, one test capable of consistently making a distinction is all it takes.

There's no difference between doing something that works without understanding and doing the exact same thing with understanding.

The author is saying at best you can only set benchmark comparisons. We just assume all humans have the capability of understanding without even really defining the meaning of understanding. And if a machine can mimic human behavior to it must also understand.

That is literally how far we can go from a logical standpoint. It's the furthest we can go in terms of classifying things as either capable of understanding or not capable or close.

What you're not seeing is the LLM is not only mimicking human output to a high degree. It can even produce output that is superior to what humans can produce.

And no I did not say that. Let me be clear I did not say that there is "no difference". I said whether there is or isn't a difference we can't fully know because we can't define or know about what "understanding" is. At best we can only observe external reactions to input.

It does not seem that cultureswitch is an alias you are using, but even if it is, the above is unambiguously the claim I am referring to here, and no other.

As for the broader issues, we have already continued that discussion elsewhere: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39503027

On writing that, I have an instinct to revise it to move the locus of understanding in the first example to the people who calculated the ballistic tables, based on physics first-principles. That would be more accurate, but my mistake highlights something interesting: an artillery officer / spotter simultaneously uses both. Is theirs a "deeper" / "truer" understanding? I don't think it is. I don't know what I think that means, for humans or AI.

I feel you are missing an important part of my point here. I am not taking a position on whether LLMs can be said to understand anything at all; I am saying that I seriously doubt that LLMs understand that the language they receive refers to an external world.

What is one such aspect? (I'm not asking in order to debate it here, but more because I want to test / research it on my own time)

Basically you just spend a lot of time with chatGPT4 and ask it deep questions that don't exist in it's dataset. get creative. The LLM will output answers that demonstrate a lack of understanding, but it will also demonstrate answers that display a remarkable amount of understanding. Both sets of answers exist and people often cite the wrong answers as evidence for lack of understanding but they're setting bar too high. The fact that many of these answers do demonstrate understanding of concepts makes it very very compelling.

Take for example Rock Paper Scissors.

https://chat.openai.com/share/ca22397c-2950-4919-bb79-6def64...

This entire conversation thread I believe does not exist in a parallel form in it's data set. It demonstrates understanding of RPS beyond the confines of text, it demonstrates understanding of simultaneity EVEN when the LLM wholly lives in a world of turn based questions and responses, it understands itself relative to simultaneity, it tries to find solutions around it's own problem, it understands how to use creativity and solutions such as cryptography to solve the problem of RPS when playing with it, it also understands the weaknesses of it's own solutions.

Conversations such as this show that chatGPT displays remarkable understanding of the world. There are conversations that are opposite to this that demonstrate LLMs displaying an obvious lack of understanding. But the existence of these conversation that lack understanding does NOT negate the ones that do demonstrate understanding. The fact that partial understanding even exists is a milestone for AI.

This isn't Anthropomorphism. People are throwing this word trying to get people to recognize their own biases without realizing that it's just demonstrating their own biases. We literally can't even define "understanding" and both LLMs and the human brain are black boxes. Making adamant claims saying that LLMs don't understand anything without addressing this fact is itself a form of bias.

The way I address the problem above is that I just define a bar. I define humans as the bar of "understanding" without defining what understanding means itself. Then if any machine begins approaching this bar in terms of input and output matching human responses, then this is logically indistinguishable from approaching "understanding". That's literally the best metric we have.

I don't know that that is quite the right question to ask.

Understanding exists on a spectrum. Even humans don't necessarily understand everything they say or claim (incl. what they say of LLMs!), and then there are things a particular human would simply say "I don't understand".

But when you ask a human "can you understand things?" you will get an unequivocal Yes!

Ask that same question of an LLM and what does it say? I don't think any of them currently respond with a simple or even qualified "Yes". Now, some might claim that one day an LLM will cross that threshold and say "Yes!" but we can safely leave that off to the side for a future debate if it ever happens.

General note: it is worth separating out things like "understanding", "knowledge", "intelligence", "common sense", "wisdom", "critical thinking", etc. While they might all be related in some ways and even overlap, it does not follow that if you show high performance in one that you automatically excel in each of the other. I know many people who anyone would say are highly intelligent but lack common sense, etc.

People in particular have evolved complex self protective mechanisms to provide the right answers for their given environment for safety reasons, based on a number of different individual strategies. For example, the overly honest, the self depreciating, the questioner, the prosecutor, the victim, the liar, the absent minded professor, the idiot, etc.

LLMs are not that complex or self-referential.

Personally, my guess is that you'd want to build a model (of some kind!) whose sole job is determining the credibility of given string of tokens (similar to what someone else noted in a sibling comment about high answer volatility based on minor input changes - that does sound like a signal of low credibility), and somehow integrate THAT self-referential feedback into the process.

Notably, even the smartest lawyers (or perhaps, especially the smartest lawyers) will have assistants do research once they've set out a strategy so they are sure THEY aren't bullshitting. Same with professors, professional researchers, engineers, etc.

Because until someone goes and actually reads the case law from a credible source, or checks the primary research, or calculates things, it's possible someone was misremembering or just wrong.

Being right more often is not about never having a wrong thought/idea/statement, it's about double checking when you're thinking you might be bullshitting, and NOT saying the bullshit answer until you've checked. Which is proportionally, very expensive. The really good professionals will generate MANY lines of such inquiry in parallel for folks to track down, and then based on their degree of confidence in each one and the expected context the answer will be used in, will formulate the 'most correct' response, which is proportionally even more expensive.

So at least during the process, there would be a signal that the system was likely 'bullshitting'. Which might help it in at least being able to signal when it's answers are low-confidence. (human equivalent of stuttering, looking down and away, looking ashamed haha!)

Every human gets fooled sometimes in at least some venue though.

That's certainly one root of the problem, but I would argue that there are multiple roots to this problem!

Humans have further realized that understanding itself is provisional and incomplete, which is quite a remarkable insight (understanding if you will), itself.

http://v.cx/2010/04/feynman-brazil-education

The students learned to repeat the text of the books, without "understanding" what the books were describing. I'm sure this says something about one side or the other of this conundrum, but I'm not sure which. :-)

The central claim is that a machine which answers exactly the same thing a human would answer given the same input does not have understanding, while the human does.

This claim is religious, not scientific. In this worldview, "understanding" is a property of humans which can't be observed but exists nonetheless. It's like claiming humans have a soul.

People also often don't understand things and have trouble separating fact from fiction. By logic only one religion or no religion is true. Consequently also by logic most religions in the world where their followers believe the religion to be true are hallucinating.

The second thing to realize that your argument doesn't really apply. Its in theory possible to create a stochastic parrot that can imitate to a degree of 100 percent the output of a human who truly understands things. It blurs the line of what is understanding.

One can even define true understanding as a stochastic parrot that generated text indistinguishable total understanding.

That's not the point being argued. Understanding, critical thinking, knowledge, common sense, etc. all these things exist on a spectrum - both in principle and certainly in humans. In fact, in any particular human there are different levels of competence across these dimensions.

What we are debating, is whether or not, an LLM can have understanding itself. One test is: can an LLM understand understanding? The human mind has come to the remarkable understanding that understanding itself is provisional and incomplete.

In fact. That question is one of the more trivial questions it will most likely not hallucinate on.

The reason why I alluded to humans here is because I'm saying we are setting the bar too high. It's like everyone is saying it hallucinates and therefore it can't understand anything. I'm saying that we hallucinate too and because of that LLMs can approach humans and human level understanding.

That's a very good point.

Getting beyond this is a tricky dark art. There isn't any simple there. There's nowhere to put an if statement.

Ask them to give you some literature recommendations on something it has explained to you. You'll get plenty of plausible sounding papers that don't exist.

Humans know to some extent why they know (read it in a text book, colleague mentioned it). LLMs don't seem to.

I can’t tell you the date of every time I clip my toenails, but if I had to could remember it.

When you ask an LLM to tell you the height of Mount Everest, it clearly has a map of mountains to heights, in some format. Using exactly the same mapping structure, it can remember a source document for the height.

This argument comes up many times “people don’t do this” - but that is a question of frequency, not whether or not people are capable.

But also, can you give an example where an LLM with access to the Internet can find a primary source?

I don't think learning to refer to sources is something inherently impossible for LLMs, but it is very different to the kind of implicit knowledge they seem to excel at.

I think perhaps your description is more succinct

And in the real world if the truck route of amazon is 20% off the mathematically optimal solution the traveling salesman is "Solved" in a good enough way.

I don’t know, the claim seems dubious to me. We usually are able to have algorithms that return a failure status, when the problem proved to be too large. Avoiding the “hallucination”. Don’t see why LLMs can’t have that embedded.

When we say “know” it usually means being factual. For an LLM to ‘know’ it doesn’t know, it would have had to move away from pure correlations on words, and meta processing about its own results.

I can see this happen with two LLMs working together (and there are Evals that use just this), however each LLM still has no self awareness of its limits.

This was a terribly convoluted argument to make.

Ask it what dark matter is, and it won't invent an answer, it will present existing theories and say that it's unknown.

Ask it about a person you know that isn't in it's data set and it'll tell you it has no information about the person.

Despite the fact that people insist that hallucinations are common and that it will invent answers if it doesn't know something frequently, the truth is that chatgpt doesn't hallucinate that much and will frequently say it doesn't know things.

One of the few cases where I've noticed it inventing things are that it often makes up apis for programming libraries and CLI tools that don't exist, and that's trivially fixable by referring it to documentation.

I can’t have a tool that makes up stuff an unknown amount of time.

There is a world of research examining hallucination Rates, indicating hallucination rates of 30%+.

With steps to reduce it using RAGs, you could potentially improve the results significantly - last I checked it was 80-90%.

And the failure types aren’t just accuracy, it’s precision, recall, relevance and more.

I want to see a citation for this. And a clear definition for what is a hallucination and what isn't.

https://www.medpagetoday.com/ophthalmology/generalophthalmol....

- Survey of Hallucination in Natural Language Generation](https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.03629) (Ji et al., 2022)

- [How Language Model Hallucinations Can Snowball](https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.13534) (Zhang et al., 2023)

- [A Multitask, Multilingual, Multimodal Evaluation of ChatGPT on Reasoning, Hallucination, and Interactivity](https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.04023) (Bang et al., 2023)

- [Contrastive Learning Reduces Hallucination in Conversations](https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.10400) (Sun et al., 2022)

- [Self-Consistency Improves Chain of Thought Reasoning in Language Models](https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.11171) (Wang et al., 2022)

- [SelfCheckGPT: Zero-Resource Black-Box Hallucination Detection for Generative Large Language Models](https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.08896) ( Manakul et al., 2023)

I feel like writing an entire paper about the practical approach to the problems posed in this paper, but you'll probably have to first formally define the language used in the training data before you can try to map it (through training and sampling algos, which this paper conveniently skipped) to the target form. This sounds really fun at first, but then we're once again talking about the strict formalisation of natural language (which you could still do - the training data is limited and fixed!)

Have any nets been trained specifically to be able to go to an 'i don't know' state, I wonder?

It may be the humans' fault.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.12906

These "AI" s are like "yes men". They will say anything to please you even if it's untrue or impossible.

I have met people like that and they are very difficult to work with. You can't trust that they will deliver the project they promised and you always have to double check everything. You also can't trust them that what they promised is even possible.

What I find frustrating that it's increasingly challenging to have DeepL translate thou -> du, as this was my go-to "hack" to overcome the incompatibility of the English language due to its missing features.

To somewhat remedy the "yes man" problem, one needs to become a pedantic mathematician about posing your questions and I don't believe that LLM technology alone is capable of overcoming it entirely. As silly as it sounds, I must concede to the existence of "prompt engineering" as I can forsee the development of abstractions aimed to decompose questions for you.

Fortunately that doesn't tell much about the limitations of the underlying intelligence but mostly about the limitations of the incentive structure you put around it

The point about employing better prompting is well taken. Don't ask "Who was the first female president?", ask "Was there ever a female president?". Much like on StackOverflow you want to ask the right question and not assume things (since you don't know enough to make assumptions).

Imagine if every time on early Google you found a spam result and then blame the search engine for that (and not your choice of keywords, or ignoring that you always want to return something, even if remotely related). Like a user banging a slab of concrete with a chisel and complaining that this does not produce a beautiful statue.

We've achieved both extremes of AI. Computers can be both logical machines and hallucinators. Our goal is to create a machine that can be both at the same time and can differentiate between both.

That's the key. Hallucination is important but the key is for the computer to be self aware about when it's hallucinating.

Of course it's a hard problem but even humans hallucinate massively. Just look at religion. Only one religion can be right or none, that must mean,logically speaking all other religions are hallucinations.

Coming to an incorrect explanation such as, “Helios pulls the Sun across the sky every day,” is categorically different than a math program incorrectly returning the most likely next token in a sequence. LLMs don’t have beliefs at all.

Helios answers a question “Why does the Sun rise?” Holding such a belief shows a logical understanding that some force must be doing this, but due to a lack of knowledge of the world, the person comes up with an incorrect explanation.

LLMs can’t pose and reason about such questions. It is just not the same class of “hallucinations.” Assuming we’ve figured out cognition via word prediction is going to get us nowhere fast in the long term.

The LLM is still a black box feed forward network. It is the intricacies of how signals interact with each other in this network that we don't fully understand.

Word prediction and curve fitting are high level concepts we used to build an intelligence we don't fully understand.

Also belief and understanding are orthogonal concepts. I can believe something I don't understand and I can understand something I don't belief.

My claim here is that LLMs understand things from a certain aspect because LLMs can produce output indistinguishable from understanding.

Also because both the human brain and the LLM are black boxes there is no other metric we can use to gauge the level of understanding an LLM has other than comparing it's inputs and outputs to the human brain.

There are some mistakes in this sentence.

It is possible (if unlikely) that multiple religions accurately describe some aspects of the world, while being mistaken about others. That is, treating rigorous complete "correctness" as the only useful state a religion could have is very misleading. Newtonian physics and special relativity both fail to predict some observed phenomena, but they're still both useful (and not every religion claims rigorous perfect correctness, even if some do).

Even if some religions can be shown to be wrong, that doesn't automatically mean that they're hallucinations. People can believe things for plausible reasons and be wrong about them.

People can also have reasonable stances like "I cannot prove this is true, and would not try to, but my subjective personal experience of visions of God persuade me it's probably real."

That seems very different to me from an LLM hallucinating a paper from whole cloth out of the blue.

This is bit off-topic but what I see as one of driving force behind existence of religions is need for personification. It seems easier for human to interact with the world and its elements by communicating with it as it was familiar parson-like entity.

Now when we talk about LLMs and AI in general, there is often personification as well.

So not surprising to find aspects of personification in the LLM. It is trained on US.

Simpler example: Dreams.

Religion is often indistinguishable from truth and reality to those who hallucinate it.

If it is good, we call it "creativity."

If it is bad, we call it "hallucination."

This isn't a bug (or limitation, as the authors say). It's a feature.

Just because those hallucinations sometimes randomly happens to be right, people concluded that being wrong is the exception, while being right is somehow the rule.

It's like when people read [insert millenias old text here], finds a part that happens to illustrate something in their life today and conclude that it is a prophecy that predicted the future.

The meaning/truth in those is nothing more than a cognitive bias from the mind of the reader, not an inherent quality of the text.

Sorry, somewhat trite and unfair, but, if there is a gambling-like dopamine reward cycle occurring, then the users would have a hard time being truly objective about any productivity boost in total. They may instead focus on the 'wins', without taking into account any overheads or 'losses', much as a gambler would do.

E.g. a search engine can give you zero useful results, and you can fine tune your query and still get nothing after scrolling through pages of results (Do people really take the losses into account when using search engines?) I find prompt engineering with LLMs more useful because you get nudged in interesting directions, and even if you come away with no direct results, you have more of an idea of what you are looking for. Maybe lateral thinking is overrated.

In terms of what we can expect of future improvements, I think it’s overly optimistic to expect any kind of super intelligence beyond what we see today (that is, having access to all the worlds publicly available information, or rapidly generating texts/images/videos that fall into existing creative patterns).

I suspect that more creative intelligence requires an extremely fine balance to not “go crazy”.. that is, producing output we’d consider creative rather than hallucinations.

I think getting this balance right will get exponentially harder as we create feedback loops within the AI that let its intelligence evolve.

And it’s entirely possible that humans have already optimised this creative intelligence feedback loop as much as the universe allows. Having a huge amount of knowledge can obviously benefit from more neurons/storage. But we simply don’t know if that’s true for creative intelligence yet

We’re already well past that point. Why? Because saying incredible things about AI attracts VC money.

If it isn't a bug, it dam well isn't a hallucination, or creativity.

This is a deeply integrated design defect. One that highlights what we're doing (statistically modeling lots of human language)...

Throwing more data against this path isnt going to magically make it wake up and be an AGI. And this problem is NOT going to go away.

The ML community need to back off the hype train. The first step is them not anthropomorphizing their projects.

LLMs are just generating tokens. Hallucination perpetuates an unhelpful anthropomorphization of LLMs.

Users see it as a machine artifact.

> Imagine a piano keyboard, eighty-eight keys, only eighty-eight and yet, and yet, new tunes, melodies, harmonies are being composed upon hundreds of keyboards every day in Dorset alone. Our language, Tiger, our language, hundreds of thousands of available words, frillions of possible legitimate new ideas, so that I can say this sentence and be confident it has never been uttered before in the history of human communication: "Hold the newsreader's nose squarely, waiter, or friendly milk will countermand my trousers." One sentence, common words, but never before placed in that order. And yet, oh and yet, all of us spend our days saying the same things to each other, time after weary time, living by clichaic, learned response: "I love you", "Don't go in there", "You have no right to say that", "shut up", "I'm hungry", "that hurt", "why should I?", "it's not my fault", "help", "Marjorie is dead". You see? That surely is a thought to take out for a cream tea on a rainy Sunday afternoon.

https://abitoffryandlaurie.co.uk/sketches/language_conversat...

Isn't this the difference between a human and an LLM?

A human knows it's making an educated guess and (should) say so. Or it knows when it's being creative, and can say so.

If it doesn't know which is which, then it really does bring it home that LLM's are not that much more than (very sophisticated) mechanical input-output machines.

Which is still very useful for a lot of things. Just maybe not things to which value is assigned based on how efficient and correct the answer is. Like you can have GPT make a marketing campaign for you, or you can have it design all the icons you need for your application UI, but you can’t reliably make it wrote high performance back-end code without having humans judge the results. Similarly you can’t use it to teach anyone anything, not really, because unless you’re already an expert on the subject being taught, you aren’t likely to spot when it gets things wrong. I guess you can argue that a lot of teaching is flawed like that, and you wouldn’t be wrong. Like, I was taught that the pyramids was build by slave labour, even after the archeological evidence had shown this to be likely false. But our text books were a decade old because our school didn’t really renew them very often… in such a case GPT might have been a more correct teacher, but the trick is that you won’t really know. Which is made even more complicated by the fact that it might teach different things to different students. Like, I just asked ChatGPT 3.5 who build the pyramids in 3 different prompts, in one it told me it was ordinary people. In the others it told me it was mostly skilled labour under guidance of “architects” and “engineers”. Still better than teaching us it was done by slave labour like my old book, but the book was still consistent in what was considered to be the truth at the time.

Also, LLM-s could report more statistical measures for each answer and external tools could interpret them.

Of course, we should absolutely pursue better understanding of both as to not throw the baby out with the bath water, but I'm not personally placing much hope in finding AGI any time soon.

"AGI" is practically already here, you just don't want to admit it: https://www.noemamag.com/artificial-general-intelligence-is-...

https://openai.com/blog/openai-codex

That's simply inaccuracy or fabrication.

Labelling it hallucination simply panders to the idea these programs are intelligent.

I think that definition is wide enough to include human intelligence, so their finding should be equally valid for humans.

Which is definitely true. Human memory and the ability to correctly recall things we though we remembered is affected by a whole bunch of things and at times very unreliable.

However, human intelligence, unlike LLMs, is not limited to recalling information we once learned. We are also able to do logical reasoning, which seems to improve in LLMs, but is far from being perfect.

Another problem is how different we treat the reliability of information depending on the source, especially based on personal bias. I think that is a huge factor, because in my experience, LLMs tend to quickly fall over and change their opinion based on user input.

This is effectively like coming up with an algorithm and then executing it. So how good/bad are these LLMs if you asked them to generate say a LUA script to compute the answer, ala counting occurrences problem mentioned in a different comment, and then pass that off to a LUA interpreter to get the answer?

I think this is a sensible approach in some problem domains with software development being a particularly good example. But I think this approach quickly falls apart as soon as your „definitely right answer“ involves real world interaction.

And if one thinks about it, most of the value any company derives comes down to some sort of real world interaction, wether directly or by proxy.

Baseball and bat together cost $1.10, the bat is $1 more than the ball, how much does the ball cost?

A French plane filled with Spanish passengers crashes over Italy, where are the survivors buried?

An armed man enters a store, tells the cashier to hand over the money, and when he departs the cashier calls the police. Was this a robbery?