In plain words: Jailbreak prompts fall apart when a few characters change, so this defense makes altered copies of the input and combines the model's answers to flag attacks. It beat prior defenses against the jailbreaks, even when attackers adapted, at a small cost to normal accuracy.
Abstract
Despite efforts to align large language models (LLMs) with human intentions, widely-used LLMs such as GPT, Llama, and Claude are susceptible to jailbreaking attacks, wherein an adversary fools a targeted LLM into generating objectionable content. To address this vulnerability, we propose SmoothLLM, the first algorithm designed to mitigate jailbreaking attacks. Based on our finding that adversarially-generated prompts are brittle to character-level changes, our defense randomly perturbs multiple copies of a given input prompt, and then aggregates the corresponding predictions to detect adversarial inputs. Across a range of popular LLMs, SmoothLLM sets the state-of-the-art for robustness against the GCG, PAIR, RandomSearch, and AmpleGCG jailbreaks. SmoothLLM is also resistant against adaptive GCG attacks, exhibits a small, though non-negligible trade-off between robustness and nominal performance, and is compatible with any LLM. Our code is publicly available at \url{https://github.com/arobey1/smooth-llm}.
Alexander Robey, Eric Wong, Hamed Hassani, George J. Pappas
arXiv:2310.03684 · cs.LG, cs.AI, stat.ML · submitted Oct 5, 2023 · updated Jun 11, 2024
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