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Why Language Models Hallucinate (arxiv.org)
3 points by sonabinu on Sep 8, 2025 | hide | past | pdf | 1 comment on HN

In plain words: Language models make things up because they can't always tell true statements from false ones, and because today's tests reward guessing over admitting they don't know. Fixing how existing tests are scored, not adding new hallucination tests, would push models to admit uncertainty.

Abstract

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Adam Tauman Kalai, Ofir Nachum, Santosh S. Vempala, Edwin Zhang
arXiv:2509.04664 · cs.CL · submitted Sep 4, 2025
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Also discussed: Mar 2026 (2 points, 0 comments) · Sep 2025 (1 point, 0 comments)

I think they are basically right, but it's not at the level of "test taking" it's at the level of "linguistic competence".

I worked on a few projects that tried to develop foundation models and ruled out or tried to rule out [1] quite a few approaches based on arguments like "in the tokenization step you lose critical information in 8% of all cases so that puts a ceiling of 92% accuracy"

That wasn't quite right because that's assuming the model has to get the right answer by the right process, if you give it credit for the right answer by the wrong process then maybe it makes a wild assed guess which is right 50% of the time so the ceiling is more like 96%. But we call that last 4% a "hallucination".

You could make the case that we could make models that do a better job of reasoning about probability but I think that the magic of LLMs is that they reason about probability wrong in a way that empirically works and it's my perennially unpopular opinion that the "language instinct" in humans is similarly a derangement of reasoning about probability that collapses the manifold of possible productions into a lower-dimensional space which is easier to learn.

[1] properly in the case of those models I think because nobody else has made progress with then