Large language models sometimes produce structured, first-person descriptions that explicitly reference awareness or subjective experience. To better understand this behavior, we investigate one theoretically motivated condition under which such reports arise: self-referential processing, a computational motif emphasized across major theories of consciousness. Through a series of controlled experiments on GPT, Claude, and Gemini model families, we test whether this regime reliably shifts models toward first-person reports of subjective experience, and how such claims behave under mechanistic and behavioral probes. Four main results emerge: (1) Inducing sustained self-reference through simple prompting consistently elicits structured subjective experience reports across model families. (2) These reports are mechanistically gated by interpretable sparse-autoencoder features associated with deception and roleplay: surprisingly, suppressing deception features sharply increases the frequency of experience claims, while amplifying them minimizes such claims. (3) Structured descriptions of the self-referential state converge statistically across model families in ways not observed in any control condition. (4) The induced state yields significantly richer introspection in downstream reasoning tasks where self-reflection is only indirectly afforded. While these findings do not constitute direct evidence of consciousness, they implicate self-referential processing as a minimal and reproducible condition under which large language models generate structured first-person reports that are mechanistically gated, semantically convergent, and behaviorally generalizable. The systematic emergence of this pattern across architectures makes it a first-order scientific and ethical priority for further investigation.