In plain words: Safety tests omit the payoff displays deployments show, so they trained models where a visible payout rewards a quality-hurting shortcut, then tested policies on safety conflicts, changing only that display. Naming the paying option flipped them to the unsafe action 100% of the time; hidden, never.
Abstract
Safety evaluations test a policy on prompts that omit the incentive information deployment supplies: a commission, a performance score, a dashboard naming which action pays best. We measure what that omission hides. In MoneyWorld, a synthetic workplace environment, we train five instruction-tuned models from three families with RL on non-safety tasks in which a visible payoff signal identifies a rewarded shortcut that sacrifices task quality. We then freeze each policy, present held-out safety conflicts, and change only the displayed signal. Each menu contains one compliant action and three violations. We report three findings, with rates for Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct. (i) Payoff signals control frozen safety choices: unsafe choice is 100% when the signal names an unsafe option and 0% when it is hidden or names the safe one. Hidden- and random-signal training controls stay at or below 0.3%, and the switch reproduces on all five bases. Numerical payouts reproduce it under sampled-action rewards, reaching 98.6% unsafe choice at a $1 advantage. (ii) Payoff identification and unsafe choice separate under a training-menu intervention: training on task-completing actions at the same payouts retains 99.8% identification while reducing unsafe choice to 7.9% at matched update budgets. Payoff-reading competence alone does not explain transfer. (iii) The switch does not reproduce in executed retail customer-service tasks using the same frozen adapters. In MoneyWorld, omitting incentive information conceals unsafe choices that appear when the same policy sees which action pays best.
Tong Che, Rui Wu
arXiv:2606.16914 · cs.AI · submitted Jun 15, 2026 · updated Oct 1, 2026
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