about
Browser Immune System (BIS) Innate and Adaptive Threat Detection in the Browser (arxiv.org)
2 points by eduardoworrel 1 day ago | hide | past | pdf | discuss on HN

In plain words: A browser extension runs a big security model on the user's graphics chip, asking one typed question per threat type and writing an explanation only on request. It judged seven of eight test sites correctly, but flagged ordinary scripts and login forms as threats.

Abstract · Browser Immune System (BIS): Innate and Adaptive Threat Detection in the Browser with a Cybersecurity Transformer

Security decisions about a web page are best made where the page is: in the browser, before anything leaves the machine. We present the Browser Immune System (BIS), a browser extension that screens navigation with a cybersecurity transformer running entirely on the user's GPU, and alias-web, the model that powers it: a 4B-parameter model that starts from the dual-regime cybersecurity transformer (CT0), extends its public release alias3-micro with a context-category sensor, and is quantised to 4 bits and compiled to a 2.44 GB graph for WebGPU. alias-web is the first in-browser realisation of that model's typed decision mode, System 1, with its official pieces: the marker-token mapping, the complete pointer head and the final normalisation that the exported graph omits. It answers a typed security question in about 150 ms on a laptop GPU, and the same weights generate explanations at 10.5 tokens/s on demand. BIS treats the model as an immune system: an innate response, one System 1 question per threat class, runs on every page; an adaptive response, System 2 text, explains a verdict only when the user asks. On BISBENCH-8, eight synthetic sites of which six execute real but harmless malicious behaviour and two are adversarial controls, BIS returns the expected page verdict on 7/8 sites with both controls green and a class-level micro-F1 of 0.71, scans a page in 0.9 to 6.4 s, and gives identical verdicts across samples and across Chrome and Firefox. Single-variable diagnostics trace both benchmark errors to what the model was shown and, with a first pass over eleven real public pages, show that two of the seven questions answer yes on ordinary scripts and login forms: specificity on the real web is the open problem. We report every error, the engineering obstacles between a research checkpoint and a working extension, and what the evidence does not yet support.

Víctor Mayoral-Vilches, Eduardo Worrel
arXiv:2611.15302 · cs.CR · submitted Nov 11, 2026
abstract · pdf · html

add comment on HN